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Abstract 
This paper uses market-to-book ratio decomposition to examine whether firms that 
issue equity through initial public offerings or seasoned equity offerings exploit mispricing 
because of investor enthusiasm or to finance growth opportunities. We find strong evidence 
that, on average, firms do not issue mispriced stocks to exploit investors but, rather, to 
finance their investment opportunities in the form of real assets, inventory, and capital 
expenses. Firms that issue overvalued stocks with the view to increase their cash holdings 
experience poor long-run performance. Overall, our results show that stock mispricing drives 
equity offerings through IPOs and SEOs. Nonetheless, high transparency and balanced 
regulation in the marketplace deter issuing firms from investing their proceeds in non–value-
creating activities. This evidence is robust to alternative measures of valuation and long-run 
performance. 
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1. Introduction 
A large body of literature documents that equity offerings through initial public 
offerings (IPOs) or seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) are among the most important events in 
a corporation’s life. Although the decision to go public or to issue equity after-listing could 
be driven by different factors, both offerings are motivated by the need to finance growth 
opportunities or, in some instances, to exploit temporary overvaluation in the marketplace.
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For instance, on the one hand, for IPOs, overvaluation rises because firms are private, 
disclose minimum information on their performance (usually only for three-year period), are 
not well-known to the market, and are likely to list during a hot market period (Demers and 
Joos, 2007). On the other hand, SEO firms issue equity to either finance growth opportunities 
or invest in non–value-creating activities. Hence, the central focus of this paper is to 
disentangle whether equity offerings are due to mispricing or the capital required to finance 
growth opportunities. 
Traditionally, the market-to-book ratio (M/B) is used to examine overvalued stocks or 
growth potential. Hence, a higher M/B could be due to both overvaluation and growth 
opportunities. Overvaluations have different implications to investors compared to growth 
opportunities. The former reflect investor exploitation, while the latter reflects value creation 
for the investors. We investigate whether equity offerings are due to overvaluation or growth 
opportunities by decomposing the M/B into two components: the market-to-value ratio (M/V), 
to measure the overvaluation component, and the value-to-book ratio (V/B), to measure 
growth opportunity. To the best of our knowledge, little is known about how overvaluation 
due to timing or growth opportunity influences firm performance, especially outside the U.S.
2
 
                                                          
1
 We are grateful to the referee for pointing out the different motives for initial listings and SEOs. 
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 We are only aware of two studies that examine the mispricing of IPOs and SEOs. The first study is by Kim and 
Weisbach (2008), who examine the motivations and mispricing for IPOs and SEOs across 38 countries by using 
the M/B instead of M/B decomposition, which distinguishes between the effects of mispricing and growth 
opportunities related to equity offerings. The second study is by Bo et al. (2011), who examine the timing of 
SEOs in China using the M/B rather than the decomposed M/B, similar to Kim and Weisbach (2008). 
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To address this question, we focus on the Indian capital market for at least four 
reasons: First is the availability of detailed public information relative to other developed and 
developing markets and the presence of regulatory bodies that encourage transparency for 
equity offering firms. For instance, under the Indian regulatory setup, the subscriber’s 
application information during IPO book building needs to be publicly available, by investor 
type, institutional or non-institutional (Clarke et al., 2016). Second, the market is the oldest 
capital market among emerging countries, dating back to 1875, and has experienced a 
number of incidents related to misvaluation (Deb and Marisetty, 2010; Clarke et al., 2016). 
Prior to 1992, the Indian IPO market was heavily regulated by the Controller of Capital 
Issues. Following a balance of payment crisis in 1991, a number of structural reforms were 
implemented that greatly deregulated a number of economic activities, resulting in the 
formation of regulatory bodies such as the Committee on the Financial Services and the 
Securities and Exchange Board of India, or SEBI (Gromley, 2010).
3
 Third, the market is less 
liquid and creates a burden on retail investors who are interested in investing in IPOs and 
who could be subject to high mispricing (i.e., overvaluation). Lastly, unlike other developed 
or emerging markets, when planning IPOs in India, firms must undergo a compulsory grading 
process by the regulators (Deb and Marisetty, 2010). The grading process is aimed at 
providing potential investors with an independent, reliable, and consistent assessment of the 
fundamentals of the IPO firm and its overall governance level (Khurshed et al., 2014). These 
features provide a unique setting for assessing the extent to which the quality of information 
transparency and the role played by the regulator mitigate the impact of mispricing related to 
equity offerings through either IPOs or SEOs. 
Using M/B decomposition on a sample of 1,856 IPOs and 796 SEOs, we find that, for 
IPOs, the overvaluation is approximately 14% lower than the 50% overvaluation reported by 
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 SEBI is the regulator of securities market in India, similar to the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission. 
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Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) for U.S. IPOs. Further, we find strong evidence that 
IPO proceeds are used to finance value-creating activities, such as real assets, inventory, and 
capital expenses. This observation is based on our analysis, which shows an increase in firm 
investments after equity issues. We find only a few cases in which IPO proceeds are used to 
increase cash holdings instead of investments. Similarly, we find firms use SEO proceeds to 
enhance firm-level investments, such as total assets, inventory, research and development 
(R&D), and capital expenditures. The evidence contrasts with previous findings on the U.S. 
market (Hertzel and Li, 2010), which show that firms use the proceeds to increase cash 
holding or reduce long-term debt. In the long run, we find underperformance for both high-
M/V (above the median) and low-M/V (below the median) overvalued IPOs. This finding is 
consistent with the fact that firms issue overvalued stocks regardless of the intended use of 
the proceeds and investors are typically overoptimistic about equity offerings in India. Hence, 
they become disappointed as price information becomes public in the long run. Despite long-
run underperformance, we find that highly overvalued IPOs experience a steeper decline in 
performance than less overvalued IPOs. We find similar evidence of underperformance 
among SEOs. 
This study makes two important contributions to the IPO and SEO literature. First, it 
shows that overvaluation drives equity offerings even in a market that encourages high 
information transparency and disclosure. Nonetheless, the proceeds from the offerings in 
such a market are used to finance real assets, inventory, and capital expenses. These findings 
are important for both institutional and individual investors, who typically invest in IPO or 
SEO offerings. Second, previous studies use the M/B as a proxy for growth opportunity and 
overvaluation. We document that overvaluation drives equity offerings but not necessarily 
growth opportunities. Hence, in the context of equity offerings (IPOs or SEOs), the M/B is a 
good proxy for overvaluation and a biased measure of growth opportunity. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature, both international and within the Indian setup, along with empirical predictions. 
Section 3 describes our data, variables, and methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical 
results and Section 5 presents a robustness check of our findings. Finally, Section 6 presents a 
summary and concluding remarks. 
2. Literature review and background of equity offerings in India 
2.1 Prior evidence of the misvaluation of public equity offerings 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan’s (2004) seminal paper investigates the misvaluation 
of IPO firms. For a sample of 2,288 U.S. IPOs from 1980 to 1997, they find significant 
overvaluation, ranging from 14% to 50%, using the ratio of price to sales (P/S); the ratio of 
price to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, or EBITDA) 
(P/EBITDA), and price-to-earnings (P/E) multiples. Each IPO firm is matched with a non-
IPO firm, using industry, size, and profitability. The authors interpret the positive (negative) 
relation between overvaluation and first-day (long-run ex post) IPO returns as the manager’s 
ability to time the market by selling overvalued equity. Kim and Weisbach (2008) explore the 
motivation of firms issuing equity, using a comprehensive pooled sample of more than 
30,000 public offerings across 38 economies internationally. They find that firms issue equity 
to time the market and finance investments. They also find that undervalued firms use the 
proceeds from listings for investment purposes, whereas overvalued listings tend to time the 
market by increasing their cash holdings. Chemmanur and Krishnan (2012) study 
overvaluation using a sample of 3,737 U.S. IPOs in 1980s and 1990s. They find that IPOs 
backed by high-reputation underwriters obtain the highest possible valuation and therefore 
their equity prices are farther from their true intrinsic value. 
Considering that a higher M/B has a twofold interpretation—higher misvaluation and 
significant growth opportunities—Elliott et al. (2008) decompose the M/B to analyze the 
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impact of both on equity and debt issuance. Following the M/B decomposition of Rhodes-
Kropf et al. (2005), Elliott et al. (2008) estimate the intrinsic value of the stocks using a 
residual income model for 9,172 U.S. securities issued between 1980 and 1999. Their 
findings indicate a higher incidence of misvaluation for equity issuances when firms prefer 
equity over debt. Hertzel and Li (2010) show that SEO firms have higher levels of mispricing 
and growth components than non-issuing firms. The authors find evidence that managers 
issue equity to time the market to reduce debt and accumulate cash, leading to poor post-issue 
stock returns. In the presence of ample firm-level growth opportunities, funds from the 
listings are used to accumulate real assets. 
During favorable market conditions, when external financing costs are low, a firm 
could time the market and issue equity, even when there is no immediate need for external 
funds to hoard cash for a rainy day at a considerable price of near- to long-term stock 
underperformance. DeAngelo et al. (2010) postulate market timing and the corporate 
lifecycle as a tentative rationale for SEOs, with stronger lifecycle effects. Using the approach 
of Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), they document that about 81% of firms primarily issue 
overvalued SEOs to fulfill their near-term cash requirements. Bo et al. (2011) study SEO 
activity among 1,081 Chinese firms and find the behavioral view of market timing explains 
post-issue stock return underperformance among Chinese firms. Overall, previous studies 
document that mispricing at the firm level determines long-run performance after equity 
issuance. 
2.2 Public equity offerings in India 
Despite the number of studies that examine the development of stock markets, 
investor (both institutional and retail) behavior, transparency, book building, and grading, 
among others, none study has exclusively examined the issues regarding the misvaluation of 
IPOs and SEOs in emerging markets, including India. Marisetty and Subrahmanyam (2010) 
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document the effect of group affiliation on the initial performance of IPOs and lend support 
to the tunneling hypothesis, wherein group firms experience higher levels of underpricing 
compared to standalone firms. Deb and Marisetty (2010) test the relevance of the IPO 
grading mechanism. They observe IPO grading has a positive effect on reducing underpricing 
and market risk and in increasing demand among retail investors and liquidity, thus 
contributing to market welfare. Bubna and Prabhala (2011) study the role of underwriters on 
the allocation, bidding, and underpricing of offerings before and after book-building regimes. 
Their empirical evidence suggests that underwriters can use their allocation powers 
extensively by assisting in pre-market price discovery and lowering underpricing. 
A priori, in emerging markets, including India, herding is common among retail 
investors. The participation of retail investors is heavily influenced by the participation of 
large and better-informed institutional investors, who enhance the IPO price (Neupane and 
Poshakwale, 2012). Surprisingly, prior studies on Indian IPO performance post issue (e.g., 
Deb and Marisetty, 2010; Marisetty and Subrahmanyam, 2010; Bubna and Prabhala, 2011) 
do not examine long-run stock performance. This is important specifically for institutional 
investors, who tend to hold stocks for the long term. 
2.3. Relative value predictions 
The discussion above cites two strands of literature: The first is related to the 
misvaluation of equities at the time of listing and the availability of investment opportunities. 
The second focuses on IPO overpricing in India but provides a weak theoretical justification 
of why IPOs are overpriced. This paper examines equity issues through IPOs and SEOs using 
M/B decomposition to unravel the related effect of timing and growth opportunities. 
Typically, a high M/B is due to (i) overvaluation and (ii) greater growth opportunities. 
As Kim and Weisbach (2008) point out, firms could issue equity to take advantage of 
mispricing or to channel wealth from new shareholders to existing ones. Alternatively, they 
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could issue equity to finance their investments or to reap the benefits of overvalued equity to 
increase liquidity for firm and stakeholders. Most empirical studies use the M/B as a proxy 
for either growth or mispricing; however, such a measure could be misleading without further 
adjustments and the results should be interpreted with caution. 
3. Data description and methodology 
3.1 Data description 
Our initial sample includes all IPOs and SEOs listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange 
(BSE) and the National Stock Exchange from 1991 (the year of financial deregulation) to 
2012. The financial and market data on IPOs and SEOs are collected from the Prime 
Database and the Securities Data Corporation database. These databases have been used in a 
number of previous studies (Marisetty and Subrahmanyam, 2010; Bubna and Prabhala, 2011; 
Gopalan and Gromley, 2013) and are widely acknowledged as the most reliable and 
comprehensive source of data for equity offerings in India. 
Our sample differs substantially from the sample of IPOs and SEOs of Kim and 
Weisbach (2008), an unfiltered sample of 3,580 IPOs and 232 SEOs in India out of a total 
sample of 17,226 IPOs and 13,142 SEOs.
4
 We obtain an initial, unfiltered sample of 3,995 
IPOs and 1,700 SEOs between 1991 and 2012 from the Prime database. We exclude 822 
IPOs and 391 SEOs due to data unavailability for the control variables required in our 
bivariate and multivariate analysis. Next, following Kim and Weisbach and Neupane and 
Poshakwale (2012), we exclude all utilities, including telecoms (194 IPOs and 84 SEOs), 
financial institutes and investment trusts (699 IPOs and 108 SEOs), and privatizations of 
state-owned enterprises (103 IPOs and 34 SEOs). This filter leaves us with a sample of 2,177 
IPOs and 1,083 SEOs. Further, we eliminate outliers by winsorizing our variables at the 1% 
and 99% levels. 
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 For the number of IPOs listed in India relative to other markets in Asia, see Table A1 of Kim and Weisbach 
(2008). 
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Next, unlike Kim and Weisbach (2008), we split the M/B into M/V and V/B 
components, using three distinct pricing multiples, similar to the approach of Rhodes-Kropf 
et al. (2005). This method requires a unique one-to-one matching of IPO with non-IPO firms, 
leaving us with 1,856 IPOs in our final sample.
5
 Following Lyon et al. (1999), we exclude 
SEOs issued by the same firm within three years of the previous SEO offering. Lyon et al. 
(1999) argue that the overlapping of event windows leads to cross-sectional correlation and 
biases the test statistics. This reduces the sample of SEO firms from 1,083 to 852. Lastly, 
since the estimation of the terminal value of the SEOs using Ohlson’s (1990) residual income 
model requires two consecutive years of accounting data around the time of the seasoned 
offering, so we finally end up with 796 SEO observations in our dataset.
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The variables in our M/B decomposition analysis are defined as follows: Mispricing, 
or the misvaluation of a firm’s equity, is captured by the M/V, where M is the market price of 
equity and V is the intrinsic value of the stock.
7
 The variable Growth opportunities for a firm 
is measured by the V/B, where V is the intrinsic value of equity and B is the book value of the 
equity; Primary capital is the total proceeds in equity issuance and is measured as a product 
of the offer price and the number of shares issued for the equity offering (IPO or SEO); Other 
sources of capital are measured as the difference between the sum of funds from the firm’s 
operating, financing, and investment activities and primary capital; Size is calculated as the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. To measure the variable use of proceeds on 
investment activities, we examine annual changes in capital expenditures, R&D, inventory 
procurement, and total assets after equity issuance. Finally, to investigate the variable use of 
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 The Appendix A1 summarizes the differences in mean characteristics between IPO and non–IPO matched 
firms.  The matching is one to one for each year of listing. The differences in firm characteristics between IPO 
firms and the matched sample are not significant at any conventional level.  
6
 Since Kim and Weisbach (2008) use a pooled sample across all countries, the final sample of Indian IPOs or 
SEOs is unclear. Nonetheless, in their multivariate analysis, the sample of IPOs was reduced by approximately 
78%, while that for SEOs was reduced by 47%. For more details on the number of observations in the 
multivariate results, see Tables 3 and 4 of Kim and Weisbach (2008). Presumably, the samples of IPOs and 
SEOs in India are far smaller than the unfiltered samples of 3,580 and 232 for IPOs and SEOs, respectively. 
7
 The calculation of the fundamental or intrinsic value for both IPOs and SEOs is detailed in Section 3.2. 
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proceeds on other activities, which includes market timing, we measure changes in cash 
holdings, and level of debt reduction post equity issue. 
3.2 Research methodology 
In this section, we discuss our methodology to examine equity misvaluation. We 
follow the methodology developed by Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) to decompose M/B into two 
components: the mispricing component (M/V) and the growth component (V/B): 
B
V
V
M
B
M
           (1) 
Where, M is the offer price at which the IPO/SEO is issued, B is the book value of the share 
at the close of the month prior to offer date and V is the fundamental value of the stock. 
Theoretically, if the equity is correctly priced, M/B ratio should be equal to one suggesting 
that market value equals the fundamental value of the listing. M/V greater (lesser) than one 
indicates that the firm is overvalued (undervalued) while V/B ratio greater than one simply 
means growth opportunities in near future (Elliot et al., 2008). For the sake of empirical 
consistency, all the variables i.e., M, B and V are considered at time zero when the equity is 
issued.
8
 Relevant and correct estimation of the intrinsic value i.e., V is the main variable in 
this paper and hence we use residual income model to calculate the intrinsic value of equity 
for SEO and IPO firms.
9
 For IPO firms, we also follow the Purnanandam and Swaminathan 
(2004) approach to compute the fair value of IPOs using the price multiples of industry peers. 
3.2.1 Estimation of M/V and V/B for IPOs 
Following Purnanandam and Swaminathan’s (2004) method of computing the 
intrinsic value of newly listed firms, we use three price multiples of non-IPO firms, namely, 
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 For SEO firms, M is the stock price at the end of the month prior to the equity issuance. For IPO firms, M is 
the offer price, since there is no stock price prior to the IPO listing. 
9
 Ohlson’s (1990) residual income model is identical to the dividend discount model commonly used in the 
determination of the value of equity. It is the standard method for calculating the fair value of equity and has 
been used in the literature to study either instances of overvaluation in mergers and acquisitions (e.g., Rhodes-
Kropf et al., 2005) or mispricing in cases of IPO issuance (Chemmanur and Krishnan, 2012) or SEO issuance 
(e.g., Elliot et al., 2008; Kim and Weisbach, 2008; Hertzel and Li, 2010). 
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P/S, P/EBITDA, and P/E. Each of these price multiples divided by the respective price 
multiple of the non-IPO matched firm yields the P/V of the IPO firm.
10
 We obtain three P/V 
ratios on the basis of three multiples that are Sales, EBITDA and Earnings respectively. We 
compute P/V and M/V ratio as follow: 
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We compute the V/B of IPO firms by dividing P/B estimated from these equations. 
Estimation of the optimum V/B of IPO firms is the key novelty of our study. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first study that to estimate the fair value of an IPO firm and 
examine whether the equity offerings at the IPO level are due to mispricing or growth 
opportunities. This method is used to compute optimum V/B control for industry and growth 
at the firm level. Therefore, we attempt to fill an important gap in the literature by 
simultaneously testing the effect of timing and investment opportunities. This gives us three 
V/B values based on three price multiples, as follows: 
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 Here, we treat P and M as analogous to each other, since they refer to the same variable, that is, the IPO offer 
price or the market value of the listed stock. 
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Where Price represents the IPO offer price, Book is the book value of share at the end of the 
month prior to the offer date, and the denominators are obtained from Eqs. (2) to (4), 
respectively. 
3.2.2 Estimation of M/V and V/B for SEOs 
We use Ohlson’s (1990) residual income model to calculate the fundamental value of 
equity for firms issuing SEOs. In the residual income model, the fair value of equity is the 
sum of the book value of equity, the present value of expected future abnormal earnings, and 
a terminal value. Abnormal earnings are earnings in excess of normal returns required by 
shareholders and the terminal value measures long-term growth opportunities. The residual 
income model for the computation of fair value is presented by Elliot et al. (2008) and 
Chemmanur and Krishnan (2012).
11
 We specifically estimate the following model: 
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where  is the fair value of equity at time 0;
12
  is the book value of equity at time 0; T is 
total time, which is two years;
13
 r is the cost of equity (detailed below);  is expected 
future earnings for year t at time 0 proxied by earnings before interest and tax (EBIT); and TV 
is the terminal value of equity, given as 
 
    
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BrXBrXE
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11
 Chemmanur and Krishnan (2012) use Ohlson’s (1990) residual income model as a robustness check to 
compute the fair value of IPO firms. Elliott et al. (2008) use the same model to compute the fair value of SEO 
firms.  
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 For SEO valuation, time 0 in the residual income model is the fiscal year-end preceding the equity issuance. 
13
 Since the estimation of fair value for SEOs requires two years of post-listing accounting data, we include SEO 
firms only up to 2011. 
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As in Eq. (8), the monthly cost of equity, r, is estimated using a single-factor model for each 
firm in our sample:
14
 
  itftmtiiftit RRRR     (10) 
where  is the return on stock i for month t;  is the risk-free rate, which is the 91-day 
Treasury bill rate at the end of month t; and  is the monthly market return, which is the 
value-weighted monthly return of the CNX Nifty Index.
15
 Applying the standard approach, 
we run rolling monthly regressions for the past 36 months’ stock returns. The variable , 
estimated in Eq. (10), is used to calculate the monthly cost of equity (ri) for firm i, using a 
single-factor model: 
    fmifi RREˆRrE    (11) 
3.2.3 Models for testing empirical predictions 
After calculating the fair value V0, the next step is to estimate the mispricing 
component M/V and the growth component V/B for all firms at the time of offer. We use two-
pair test statistics to examine if the M/V and V/B values of IPO/SEO firms are significantly 
greater than one. We are interested in testing if issuing firms are overvalued, have growth 
opportunities, or both. Next, in the vein of Hertzel and Li (2010), we analyze the impact of 
misvaluation and growth components on the use of the actual proceeds of equity listings, 
controlling for primary capital raised in equity issuance, other sources of internally generated 
funds, and size, with the following equation: 
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approach for IPO valuation and the discounted cash flow method for SEOs. 
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 The CNX Nifty Index consists of the 50 largest firms in terms of market capitalization, thereby representing 
about 75% of the total market capitalization of all listed firms in India. 
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where Yit = ((Sit – Si0)/TAi0) for inventory or cash or total assets Sit for firm i for year t = 1, …, 
4, with Yit = ( /TAi0) for capital or R&D expenses or long-term debt reduction Sij for 
firm i and year j = 1, …, 4. We run six regressions where the dependent variable is the change 
in the six accounting variables cash, inventory, total assets, R&D, capital expenditure, and 
reduction in long-term debt, measured over the four years +1, +2, +3, and +4 after issue 
years. PCi is the primary capital raised (i.e.: product of offer price and number of shares 
issued) for the i
th
 firm, OSCi is the other sources of capital (i.e.: the difference between total 
funds and primary capital) for the i
th
 firm. TAi0 is the total assets for i
th
 firm at time zero and 
DT and DI are year and industry fixed effect dummies respectively. 
Lastly, we analyze the long-run performance of issuing firms by constructing 
portfolio of high and low M/V and high and low V/B components using calendar-time 
approach. In order to examine the long-run performance of the IPOs/SEOs, we use calendar-
time factor regression from 1991 to 2012. We form equally (and value) weighted portfolios 
of firms that issued IPOs/SEOs in the three years after issuance. Therefore, we drop listing 
after 2009 from our sample. Long-run performance is examined using Carhart’s (1997) four-
factor model: 
 
  itt4t3t2ftmt1iftpt MOMHMLSMBRRRR    (13) 
 
where  is the monthly portfolio return calculated for month t and  is the risk-free rate;
16
 
 is the market risk premium, where  is the monthly value-weighted market 
returns of the CNX Nifty Index; is the difference between monthly returns on 
portfolios of small stocks and large stocks; and  is the difference between the monthly 
returns of high and low book-to-market stock portfolios. The fourth factor, added by Carhart 
                                                          
16
 We use 91-day treasury-bill rate as a proxy for risk-free rate. 
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(1997), is , the momentum factor,
17
 which is the difference between the returns on 
portfolios of high-momentum stocks (with high past returns) and low-momentum stocks 
(with low past returns). The term α is the intercept and a measure of abnormal performance.18 
We follow the standard factor construction procedure for , and  as 
outlined by Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). 
4. Empirical analysis 
This section discusses the main findings of the study. Section 4.1 reports the estimates 
of yearly average and median M/B values and decomposes the annual median M/B into 
overpricing (M/V) and growth opportunity (V/B) components. Section 4.2 explores the actual 
use of the proceeds raised from equity listings. Long-run performance results are discussed in 
Section 4.3. 
4.1 Evidence of misvaluation and growth opportunities 
Table 1 shows that, during 1991–2012, two-thirds (1,237 IPOs) of new listings took 
place in the mid-1990s (1994–1997). This is due to a boom period for Indian IPOs that was 
largely driven by the opening up of the Indian economy (Khurshed et al., 2014). Following 
several infamous bogus IPOs,
19
 SEBI decided to adopt more stringent listing requirements 
and the IPO market subsequently dried up until 2005. Except for government companies, 
which was part of the government’s privatization initiative, this period witnessed about 8% of 
the total listings in our sample period, with the majority of 63 IPOs in 2001. A slump period 
followed the Asian financial crisis and the dot-com collapse in the global capital markets 
(Khurshed et al., 2014). Finally, with the implementation of the IPO grading system (Deb and 
Marisetty, 2010), the IPO market gained momentum in the late 2000s and this period (2006–
2012) contributes about 20% (377 IPOs) of new listings in our sample. 
                                                          
17
 Momentum is computed on the basis of previous twelve-month monthly returns. 
18
 α, also known as Jensen’s Alpha is the measure for abnormal performance. Here significant negative, zero and 
positive α values refer to negative, none and positive abnormal performances respectively. 
19
 Please refer Gopalan and Gromley (2013) and Deb and Marisetty (2010) for detailed list of fraudulent and 
bogus listings during 1990s in India. 
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Tables 1 also present the annual cross-sectional distribution of the median and mean 
M/B for Indian IPOs from 1991 to 2012. The median (average) M/B for the entire sample is 
1.03 (3.92). These results show that the M/B value of IPOs is more than one, which indicates 
overpricing, growth opportunities, or both. 
 [Please insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 presents the yearly cross-sectional distribution of the median M/B of IPO 
firms divided by M/V (Panel A of Table 2) and V/B (Panel B of Table 2), using three price 
multiples—P/S, P/EBITDA, and P/E—to authenticate the presence of overpricing and growth 
options for newly listed firms.
20
 Panel A of Table 2 shows that the median M/V value for all 
three multiples is significantly greater than one, with the P/S multiple exhibiting median 
overpricing of about 31% during our sample period. Except for during the early 1990s, the 
median M/V values of IPO firms are consistently high and significant for most of the sample 
period, ranging between eight (for the P/E multiple) and 14 (for the P/S multiple) years. 
Moreover, the median M/V value across all three pricing multiples for the full sample is 
significantly greater than one. This result shows that, in almost all the years and on average, 
IPOs are generally overvalued, leading to investor expropriation during the time of listing and 
exploitation though issuing IPOs. 
Panel B of Table 2 reports the yearly cross-sectional distribution of the median V/B 
value of IPO firms based on the three price multiples. It is clear from the table that the V/B 
value of IPOs based on the P/S multiple is significantly greater than one in four years but less 
than one in eight years. The figures do not vary substantially when we consider V/B from the 
perspective of the P/EBITDA multiple. Table 2 shows that the V/B values for all three 
multiples are significantly higher than one, mainly in the early 1990s, until 1995, which was a 
period of financial easing in India, thereby offering firms expansion possibilities, leading to 
                                                          
20
 Qualitatively similar results hold using the mean value of M/V and V/B rations for IPOs. The results are not 
reported here due to brevity but available from the authors upon request. 
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higher demand for capital. Finally, we obtain mixed results when we investigate the full 
sample. In a nutshell, V/B is significantly less than one for the P/S multiple (median = 0.77) 
and almost one for the P/EBITDA multiple (median = 0.99). Overall, the results show periods 
of high and low valuation during the sample periods. 
[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 presents the univariate results of mispricing and growth opportunities for SEO 
firms. The table presents the cross-sectional distribution of the median
21
 M/B, M/V, and V/B 
for 796 SEOs between 1991 and 2011.
22
 The sample of SEO firms is similar to that of IPOs 
and both are subject to the same level of scrutiny and regulation. Since the focus of our study 
is to investigate misvaluation, studying only the IPO sample would provide an incomplete 
overview. Hence, we study overvaluation in the context of SEOs to provide a full picture of 
misvaluation across the two classes of equity issues. Although the motivations behind the 
decision to go public and issue new stocks differ, the two methods of raising capital are both 
subject to misvaluation, motivating our choice to assess misvaluation for the two sub-groups. 
 It is evident from Panel A of Table 3 that, in India, the seasoned equity market has 
only picked up in the last decade (since 2005), with more than half of the total SEO activity 
(417 SEOs) taking place during the time of the sub-prime financial crisis (2008–2010), when 
debt was either expensive or difficult to procure. The values for M/B (median = 1.44) and 
M/V (median = 1.46) for the full sample period are significantly greater than one and almost 
one for V/B (median = 0.96). When M/B is split into M/V (Panel B, Table 3) and V/B (Panel 
C, Table 3), the median M/V is significantly greater (lesser) than one in six (one) years and 
the median V/B is significantly greater (lesser) than one in seven (one) years. Overall, our 
                                                          
21
 Qualitatively similar results hold when we use the mean values of M/V and V/B for SEOs. The results are not 
reported in detail here but are available from the authors upon request. 
22
 For the SEO sample, we stop at 2011 because of the terminal value and momentum calculations, which 
require the previous 12 monthly returns. 
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results show that SEO is associated with both market timing and raising cash to finance 
growth opportunities. 
[Please insert Table 3 about here] 
4.2 Issuance proceeds: Liquidity versus growth opportunities 
Loughran and Ritter (1997) document that SEO firms use issuance proceeds to 
increase their investment levels, while Kim and Weisbach (2008) hypothesize that investment 
financing is the primary motive behind initiating an IPO. We intend to investigate the 
difference in the post-issuance investment behavior of firms issuing equity. If equity issuance 
is motivated by stock overvaluation, we should observe an increase in cash holdings and/or a 
reduction in debt levels after the listing. Nonetheless, if equity is raised to finance investment 
requirements, we should observe an increase in investment levels (e.g., total assets, capital 
expenditure, inventory, and R&D) in the post-issuance period. With this backdrop, in this 
section we examine the actual use of listing proceeds by investigating the relation between 
pre-issue mispricing (M/V) and growth (V/B) components up to four years of post-listing 
investment levels, debt-reduction and change in cash-holdings. 
We use regression analysis similar to Kim and Weisbach (2008) and Hertzel and Li 
(2010) to examine the relation between post-issue use of equity proceeds and pre-issue 
mispricing and growth component for IPO and SEO firms. In order to investigate the use of 
equity proceeds on different activities, we classify six accounting parameters into two sets of 
tasks – capitalize on equity overvaluation (cash- holdings and debt reduction) or utilizing the 
proceeds to increase investment levels (e.g., total assets, R&D expenses, inventory levels, and 
capital expenditures). We regress the changes in all six accounting variables on the 
mispricing and growth components of the pre-issue M/B using Eq. (12), controlling for firm-
level factors. Our approach is similar to that of Kim and Weisbach (2008) and Hertzel and Li 
(2010), except for the decomposition of M/B into growth and mispricing. 
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Table 4 presents the regression results for up to four years with respect to the 
accounting variables across three distinct multiples (P/S, P/EBITDA, and P/E) used to 
compute the fundamental value of the IPO firms. Panels A, B, and D clearly show that annual 
changes in total assets (P/EBITDA and P/E multiples), inventory levels (P/S, P/EBITDA, and 
P/E multiples), and capital expenses (P/EBITDA and P/E multiples) are positively affected by 
the growth opportunity (V/B) component in the pricing misvaluation of the IPO at the time of 
listing. Unlike Kim and Weisbach (2008), we do not find any influence of IPO overpricing 
(M/V) on the repayment of long-term debt due to the stricter norms implemented by SEBI 
(Bubna and Prabhala, 2010).
23
 These results show that firms initially list their equity on the 
capital market to primarily finance positive-net present value projects and therefore use 
equity proceeds in the post-issue period on either capital expenses or total assets or invest in 
current assets such as inventory. The results are economically significant; for example, a one 
standard deviation increase in V/B using the P/E multiple increases total assets and capital 
expenditure by 9.7% compared to the P/EBITDA multiple, which increases total assets and 
capital expenditure by 8.5%. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in V/B increases 
inventory holdings by 12.5% for the P/S multiple, 9.9% for the P/EBITDA multiple, and 
10.2% for the P/E multiple. Only a small fraction of the IPO firms attempt to time the market 
by using issuance proceeds to increase their cash holdings. 
[Please insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 5 presents the SEO regression results. The overall findings with respect to SEO 
firms are qualitatively similar to the IPO firm results. It is evident from the results that listed 
firms revisit capital markets to tap future investment opportunities (the V/B component of 
M/B) by increasing their total assets over time. We find that a one standard deviation increase 
in V/B increases total assets by 11.8% and capital expenses by just 2.7%. However, the 
                                                          
23
 One of the many requirements for floating an IPO is for the firm to be profitable in at least three of the five 
pre-listing years, with distributable profits. Therefore the IPO firm should be almost debt free, to obtain a 
reasonably good IPO grading. 
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impact of the M/V on cash holdings and debt reduction is also economically significant. For 
instance, a one standard deviation increase in M/V increases cash holdings and reduces debt 
by 51.6%. Therefore, in the long run, managers could also reissue overpriced equity (the M/V 
component of M/B) to either increase their cash holdings or reduce their debt levels. Unlike 
for IPOs, we obtain mixed results for changes in inventory levels and capital expenses. 
Unlike the results for SEOs in the U.S. market (DeAngelo et al., 2010; Hertzel and Li, 2010), 
in emerging markets that are heavily regulated and transparent, management is subject to 
greater market scrutiny when raising external funds. Therefore, managers are reluctant to 
misguide the stakeholders and primarily use listings revenue for future investments. Overall, 
a market that is well regulated and promotes transparency is likely to protect shareholders and 
stakeholders. 
[Please insert Table 5 about here] 
Together, the results provide support that M/B, as a measure of growth, is less reliable 
in terms of incentives for a firm to issue equity. Hence, decomposing the ratio into mispricing 
and growth opportunities is more meaningful. Our results show that the rational expectation 
of issuing new and seasoned equity is to invest in future growth options and maximize long-
term shareholder value. This evidence is robust in the context of a market that is highly 
regulated and encourages transparency. 
4.3 Long-run post-listing performance across the M/B components 
It well documented in the literature that newly listed IPOs and SEOs underperform in 
the long run (e.g., Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995, 1997; Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan, 2004; Kim and Weisbach, 2008; Hertzel and Li, 2010). Typically, as in real 
investment theory, firms with highly overpriced equity should experience greater post-listing 
underperformance. Rational expectation theory suggests that firms with significant growth 
options should experience greater underperformance following equity issuance in the long 
21 
 
run. In the following sections, we discuss the results of long-run performance for IPOs and 
SEOs with reference to mispricing and growth opportunities. We divide IPO/SEO firms into 
firms with high versus low levels of mispricing and high- versus low-growth firms. Firms 
with M/V values above (below) the median are classified as having a high (low) 
overvaluation level. Similarly, firms with V/B values above (below) the median are classified 
as having more (fewer) growth options. Following Hertzel and Li (2010), we use a calendar-
time approach to examine the long-run performance of newly listed firms. We use Carhart’s 
(1997) four-factor model to examine long-run performance three years after equity issuance. 
We also report the figures for two simpler versions of Carhart’s (1997) model, namely, the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and Fama and French’s (1993) three-factor model.24 
Table 6 shows the post-issue long-run performance results for IPOs with high versus 
low levels of mispricing across three valuation multiples: P/S (Panel A), P/EBITDA (Panel 
B), and P/E (Panel C). The intercept is negative and statistically significant in Panels A to C. 
On average, firms with both higher levels of mispricing (model 1 of Panels A to C) and lower 
levels of mispricing (model 2 of Panels A to C) exhibit strong underperformance in the long 
run, ranging from -0.06% per month (-0.72% per annum) to -0.08% per month (about -1.00% 
per annum), compared to the benchmark market index. Model 3 in Panel B shows a marginal 
performance difference (0.24%) between IPOs with high and low levels of mispricing when 
the intrinsic value is estimated using the P/EBITDA pricing multiple. This result provides 
ancillary support for the behavioral aspect of higher underperformance among more 
overvalued firms in the post-IPO period. The results for the three- and four-factor models are 
broadly comparable to those of the market model (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997) 
across all three pricing multiples. 
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 For ease of illustration, we mainly focus on the intercept values obtained using the CAPM, since this is the 
simplest and easiest way to interpret our three models. The results for Fama and French’s (1993) and Carhart’s 
(1997) models are qualitatively and (somewhat) quantitatively similar to those of the CAPM, although weaker 
in a few dimensions and we therefore discuss them where applicable.  
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[Please insert Table 6 about here] 
Table 7 reports the results for IPOs with higher versus lower growth opportunities 
across the three valuation multiples. Unlike for Kim and Weisbach (2008), in our study, firms 
with higher growth opportunities witness a steeper average monthly (three-year) decline of up 
to -0.08% (about -3%) in equity returns over the long run. New IPOs with fewer chances of 
growth improvement also show a significant post-issue decrease in monthly stock returns of 
about 0.06%. Overall, we find stock prices decline in the long run for IPOs after listings but, 
interestingly, there is no significant difference between high- and low-growth firms, 
regardless of their future growth options. 
[Please insert Table 7 about here] 
Finally, in Table 8, we revisit the long-run performance of SEO firms. Panels A and B 
shows the long-run performance of SEOS with high versus low levels of mispricing and high- 
versus low-growth SEOs, respectively. We find evidence of management’s attempts to time 
the market by issuing highly overpriced follow-up issues. However, the market seems to 
penalize such firms with significantly negative average post-issue abnormal returns (-0.13% 
monthly, -1.6% annually). Underpriced SEOs do not underperform after listings, which is 
consistent with the behavioral view of SEO mispricing. The results show that low-growth 
SEOs significantly underperform in the long run (up to 1.5% over a three-year period), while 
high-growth SEOs do not underperform. Finally, the results are mixed when we examine the 
returns between SEOs with various levels of mispricing (Panel A3, Table 8) and growth 
options (Panel B3, Table 8). Even though SEOs with higher overpricing or lower growth 
opportunities face significant decline over time, this evidence is not explained by either 
behavioral theory or rational real investment theory. 
[Please insert Table 8 about here] 
23 
 
5. Robustness check: IPO valuation using the residual income model 
In this section, we check the robustness of our results by computing the fair value of 
IPO firms using the discounted cash flow method, similar to Ohlson’s (1990) residual income 
model.
25
 Chemmanur and Krishnan (2012) document that estimating the fair value of IPO 
firms using the residual income model allows checking the robustness of the results with 
respect to the fair value of the IPO firms calculated using price multiples. We use the 
following residual model to compute the fair value of the IPO firms, an approach similar to 
that of Ohlson (1990) and Chemmanur and Krishnan (2012):
26
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where  is the fair value of equity at time 0;  is the book value of equity at time 0; T is 
total time, that is, two years; r is the cost of equity (the estimation for the cost of equity is 
detailed below);  is expected future earnings for year t at time 0, proxied by EBIT; 
year 0 is the fiscal year-end preceding the equity issuance; and TV is the terminal value of 
equity, which is calculated as 
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We compute the required rate of return on the basis of the average excess annual rate of 
return on the BSE Sensex and CNX Nifty Index during our sample period. Our objective is to 
measure the growth rate of the BSE Sensex and CNX Nifty Index over time. To do so, we use 
the growth rate measure proposed by Jones (1995), using the following equation: 
  tt tYLn    (16) 
Where Yt is the benchmark stock index level at the end of year t. From this equation, we 
compute the required rate of return as  
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 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for making this suggestion to further establish the robustness of 
our empirical findings with respect to IPO misvaluation. 
26
 We also use the residual income model to compute the intrinsic value of SEOs (see Section 3.2.2). 
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We estimate Eq. (16 ) for the BSE Sensex and CNX Nifty Index separately. In both cases, we 
find the required rate of return to be approximately 13%. Hence, in Eq. (15), we set r as 
13%.
27
 Next, similar to Chemmanur and Krishnan (2012), we compute the intrinsic value of 
IPO firms using two growth rates: g = 0% and g = 5%.
28
 We report the regression results of 
Eq. (12), where the fundamental value of the IPO firm is computed using the residual income 
model in Table 9. 
[Please insert Table 9 about here] 
Table 9 reports the impact of mispricing and growth opportunities on the actual use of 
proceeds, assuming a zero growth rate (Table 9A) and a 5% growth rate (Table 9B), 
respectively. We find a significant positive relation between the growth component (V/B) and 
changes in total assets, inventory, and capital expenditure, using either the zero or the 5% 
growth rate. However, the relation between the mispricing component (M/V) and changes in 
cash holdings and long-term debt reduction is either negative and significant (for changes in 
cash holding) or insignificant (for debt reduction). Overall, the results in Table 9 are 
consistent with the rational explanation of equity issuance and the overall results reported in 
Table 4. 
6. Summary and concluding remarks 
This study examines whether equity issues through IPOs or SEOs are due to 
mispricing or growth opportunities. To address this question, we follow the method of 
                                                          
27
 We also estimate r using the gross domestic product per capita growth rate in India, which, on average, is 
about 9.5% during our sample period. With r = 9.5%, the results remain qualitatively similar to those reported in 
Table 9 with r = 13%. 
28
 As Chemmanur and Krishnan (2012), we also compute the mispricing component, that is, M/V, in two ways: 
The first is by taking M as the offer price at which the IPO was issued and the second is where M is the closing 
price of the stock on the first day of the listing. We find qualitatively similar results using both measures of 
mispricing. However, due to space constraints and to maintain consistency with the previous computation of the 
fair value of the IPO using price multiples matched by industry peers (reported in Table 4), we report the results 
based on offer price. However, the results based on the closing price of the IPO on the first day of the listing are 
available from the authors upon request.  
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Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) to decompose M/B into M/V, to account for mispricing, and V/B, 
to control for growth opportunities. Our results show instances of market timing similar to 
those of developed markets but the proceeds from equity offerings are used to finance 
investment opportunities, such as real assets, inventory, and capital expenses. We conjecture 
that tight regulation and high transparency limit issuing firms from the tendency to exploit 
investors and motivates them to focus on value-creating activities. Our results show that the 
market penalizes firms that issue overvalued stocks to increase their cash holdings, as 
exhibited by poor long-term stock performance. However, IPOs and SEOs in India are 
subject to both mispricing and growth opportunities. Issuing firms tend to invest in value-
creating rather than value-destroying activities. Further, mispricing drives equity offerings 
more than growth opportunities. Hence, M/B is a biased proxy for growth opportunities in the 
context of equity offerings. Our findings are robust to alternative measures of firm valuation 
and a battery of control variables and different model specifications. These findings are not 
only interesting to regulators, but also to institutional and individual investors interested in 
investing over the long term. 
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Table 1 
Number, median and mean market-to-book of Indian IPOs by year 
 
Year No. of 
IPOs 
Median 
M/B 
Wilcoxon 
p-value 
Mean 
M/B 
t-test 
p-value 
1991 9 1.44 0.250 2.00 0.250 
1992 27 2.09 0.002 5.53 0.014 
1993 55 1.56 0.000 3.46 0.006 
1994 242 1.25 0.000 3.68 0.005 
1995 446 1.51 0.000 8.68 0.003 
1996 429 0.82 0.673 2.04 0.005 
1997 120 0.59 0.007 1.19 0.310 
1998 12 0.21 0.001 0.23 0.000 
1999 7 0.18 0.297 0.58 0.346 
2000 16 0.59 0.528 4.56 0.055 
2001 63 0.79 0.533 2.89 0.039 
2002 4 0.26 0.125 0.37 0.044 
2003 6 0.11 0.438 1.44 0.751 
2004 10 0.38 0.432 3.13 0.424 
2005 34 0.63 0.497 1.47 0.307 
2006 63 1.19 0.018 1.81 0.001 
2007 76 1.06 0.008 2.27 0.000 
2008 78 1.24 0.031 1.53 0.013 
2009 34 0.45 0.079 5.17 0.336 
2010 37 1.09 0.481 1.78 0.190 
2011 54 1.39 0.000 1.83 0.000 
2012 34 0.83 0.621 1.47 0.139 
Overall 1856 1.03 0.000 3.92 0.000 
Notes: This table reports cross-sectional distribution of market-to-book (M/B) ratio of Indian IPOs from 1991 to 
2012. In M/B ratio, numerator is the offer price at which the IPO stock is offered and denominator is the book 
value of share at the close of the month prior to the offer date. No. of IPOs is the total number of Indian IPOs in 
a year for which we have available M/B ratio data. Both median and mean M/B is shown. Wilcoxon p-value 
represents p-value of Wilcoxon rank sum test to test if median is equal to one. t-test p-value of mean M/B 
represents p-value of t-test if mean is equal to 1. Overall corresponds to the aggregate of all the IPOs from 1991 
to 2012 and the statistics for overall are computed on the basis of pooled time-series and cross-sectional data. 
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Table 2 
Median market-to-value and value-to-book of Indian IPOs by year using match-firm multiples 
 
 Panel A: Market-to-value ratio based on pricing multiples  Panel B: Value-to-book ratio based on pricing multiples 
 
Price/Sales multiple 
 
Price/EBITDA multiple 
 
Price/Earnings multiple 
 
Price/Sales multiple 
 
Price/EBITDA multiple 
 
Price/Earnings multiple 
Year No. of 
IPOs 
Med
ian 
Wilcox
on p-
value 
No. of 
IPOs 
Medi
an 
Wilcox
on p-
value 
 
No. of 
IPOs 
Media
n 
Wilcoxon 
p-value 
No. of 
IPOs 
Medi
an 
Wilcox
on p-
value 
 
No. of 
IPOs 
Medi
an 
Wilcox
on p-
value 
 No. of 
IPOs 
Medi
an 
Wilcox
on p-
value 
  
  
  
  
  
1991 9 0.57 0.820 
 
9 0.57 0.910 
 
8 0.53 0.313 
 
9 1.47 0.359 
 
9 2.19 0.164 
 
8 3.18 0.148 
1992 27 0.91 0.761 
 
27 0.87 0.452 
 
23 0.76 0.906 
 
27 1.99 0.003 
 
27 1.38 0.103 
 
23 2.67 0.001 
1993 55 0.89 0.273 
 
54 0.79 0.088 
 
37 1.31 0.106 
 
55 1.59 0.000 
 
54 1.49 0.003 
 
37 1.20 0.023 
1994 242 0.86 0.020 
 
238 0.85 0.307 
 
182 0.68 0.393 
 
242 1.37 0.000 
 
238 1.00 0.001 
 
182 1.79 0.000 
1995 446 0.87 0.040 
 
446 0.62 0.219 
 
348 0.62 0.860 
 
446 1.93 0.000 
 
446 1.08 0.000 
 
348 2.36 0.000 
1996 429 1.27 0.000 
 
427 1.18 0.000 
 
278 1.58 0.000 
 
429 0.66 0.999 
 
427 0.30 0.000 
 
278 0.55 0.951 
1997 120 3.15 0.000 
 
119 3.97 0.000 
 
66 4.43 0.000 
 
120 0.23 0.000 
 
119 0.07 0.000 
 
66 0.10 0.000 
1998 12 2.00 0.016 
 
12 1.55 0.151 
 
10 0.90 0.846 
 
12 0.07 0.002 
 
12 0.11 0.001 
 
10 0.22 0.002 
1999 7 1.98 0.016 
 
7 1.07 0.813 
 
4 3.38 0.625 
 
7 0.03 0.078 
 
7 0.03 0.297 
 
4 0.08 0.875 
2000 16 1.52 0.093 
 
16 1.34 0.376 
 
11 1.48 0.240 
 
16 0.53 0.744 
 
16 0.12 0.376 
 
11 0.19 0.638 
2001 63 1.75 0.000 
 
61 0.82 0.215 
 
38 0.83 0.124 
 
63 0.63 0.268 
 
61 0.28 0.114 
 
38 0.91 0.313 
2002 4 4.40 0.625 
 
4 5.27 0.625 
 
2 24.01 1.000 
 
4 0.09 0.125 
 
4 0.15 0.125 
 
2 0.16 0.500 
2003 6 3.67 0.156 
 
6 2.26 0.438 
 
6 3.00 0.156 
 
6 0.04 0.438 
 
6 0.04 0.438 
 
6 0.05 0.031 
2004 10 2.15 0.232 
 
10 2.08 0.322 
 
6 1.44 0.313 
 
10 0.08 0.084 
 
10 0.02 0.002 
 
6 0.05 0.031 
2005 34 1.61 0.004 
 
34 1.09 0.047 
 
27 0.80 0.657 
 
34 0.30 0.519 
 
34 0.52 0.563 
 
27 1.01 0.120 
2006 63 2.14 0.000 
 
63 1.65 0.000 
 
55 1.70 0.000 
 
63 0.62 0.995 
 
63 0.77 0.164 
 
55 1.17 0.060 
2007 76 1.86 0.000 
 
76 1.54 0.000 
 
67 1.47 0.000 
 
76 0.56 0.818 
 
76 0.73 0.782 
 
67 0.79 0.557 
2008 78 2.60 0.000 
 
78 1.21 0.002 
 
67 1.42 0.000 
 
78 0.37 0.026 
 
78 0.49 0.431 
 
67 0.57 0.814 
2009 34 1.87 0.002 
 
34 1.40 0.195 
 
19 1.21 0.134 
 
34 0.18 0.387 
 
34 0.10 0.079 
 
19 0.19 0.891 
2010 37 3.79 0.000 
 
37 1.64 0.001 
 
30 1.38 0.015 
 
37 0.29 0.000 
 
37 0.58 0.099 
 
30 0.82 0.787 
2011 54 2.27 0.000 
 
54 2.04 0.000 
 
44 1.62 0.000 
 
54 0.62 0.053 
 
54 0.65 0.712 
 
44 0.79 0.819 
2012 34 2.53 0.000 
 
34 2.34 0.005 
 
24 1.83 0.024 
 
34 0.38 0.053 
 
34 0.49 0.142 
 
24 0.57 0.868 
Overall 1856 1.31 0.000   1846 1.05 0.000   1352 1.061 0.000   1856 0.77 0.000  
1846 0.56 0.523 
 
1352 0.99 0.000 
Notes: This table reports cross-sectional distribution of median market-to-value (M/V) and value-to-book (V/B) ratios of Indian IPOs from 1991 to 2012. M/V and V/B of the 
IPO firm is computed on the basis of three price multiples of an industry peers i.e. price-to-sales (P/S), price-to-EBITDA and price-to-earnings (P/E). EBITDA is earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization. Earnings are net income or profit after tax. M/V ratio of IPO firm is computed as P/S, P/EBITDA and P/E of IPO firm 
divided by corresponding P/S, P/EBITDA and P/E of the match firm. V/B ratio of the IPO firm is computed as M/V ratio of the IPO firm (using all three multiples) divided by 
M/B of the IPO firm. No. of IPOs is the total number of Indian IPOs in a year for which we have available matching price multiple. Wilcoxon p-value represents p-value of 
Wilcoxon rank sum test to test if median is equal to one. Overall corresponds to the aggregate of all the IPOs from 1991 to 2012 and the statistics for overall are computed on 
the basis of pooled time-series and cross-sectional data. 
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Table 3 
Median market-to-book, market-to-value and value-to-book ratios of Indian SEOs by year 
 
 
Panel A: Market-to-book 
 
Panel B: Market-
to-value  
Panel C: Value-to-
book 
Year No. of 
SEOs 
Median 
M/B 
Wilcoxon 
p-value  
Median 
M/V 
Wilcoxon 
p-value  
Median 
V/B 
Wilcoxon 
p-value     
1991 1 4.43 1.000 
 
2.36 1.000 
 
1.88 1.000 
1992 2 0.63 0.500 
 
0.71 1.000 
 
0.97 0.688 
1993 11 1.64 0.206 
 
0.43 0.426 
 
2.51 0.000 
1994 39 1.60 0.002 
 
3.29 0.000 
 
0.76 0.511 
1995 20 1.51 0.009 
 
0.73 0.570 
 
0.55 0.854 
1996 12 1.53 0.043 
 
1.47 0.232 
 
0.62 0.720 
1997 1 4.23 1.000 
 
4.08 1.000 
 
1.04 1.000 
1998 1 0.14 1.000 
 
0.13 1.000 
 
1.12 1.000 
1999 2 1.61 1.000 
 
0.51 0.500 
 
3.04 0.500 
2000 3 1.52 0.750 
 
1.17 0.750 
 
0.77 1.000 
2001 8 1.22 0.445 
 
0.55 0.727 
 
0.89 0.813 
2002 5 0.42 0.063 
 
1.45 0.438 
 
0.30 0.063 
2003 22 0.40 0.000 
 
0.26 0.000 
 
2.00 0.001 
2004 30 1.32 0.211 
 
0.52 0.225 
 
1.30 0.005 
2005 63 1.65 0.000 
 
1.35 0.004 
 
1.22 0.002 
2006 82 2.50 0.000 
 
1.71 1.000 
 
1.34 0.002 
2007 71 4.22 0.000 
 
3.08 0.000 
 
1.79 0.000 
2008 126 1.76 0.000 
 
2.23 0.000 
 
0.62 0.107 
2009 203 1.00 0.009 
 
1.47 0.000 
 
0.72 0.298 
2010 88 1.19 0.003 
 
1.18 0.005 
 
0.88 0.208 
2011 6 1.79 0.063 
 
0.35 0.125 
 
5.27 0.031 
Overall 796 1.44 0.000 
 
1.46 0.000 
 
0.96 0.000 
Notes: This table reports cross-sectional data of median market-to-book (M/B), market-to-value (M/V) and 
value-to-book (V/B) of the SEOs from 1991 to 2011. M/B of the SEO firm is the ratio at the end of month prior 
to equity issuance month. In M/V and V/B, M represents market value of equity at the close of the month prior to 
equity issuance month and V represents fair value of equity which is computed by using residual income model, 
and B is the book value of share at the close of the month prior to the offer date. No. of SEOs is the total number 
of Indian SEOs in a year for which we have available M/B ratio data. Wilcoxon p-value represents p-value of 
Wilcoxon rank sum test to test if median is equal to one. Overall corresponds to the aggregate of all the SEOs 
from 1991 to 2011 and the statistics for overall are computed on the basis of pooled time-series and cross-
sectional data. 
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Table 4 
Effect of mispricing and growth opportunities on post-issue changes in assets and expenditures for Indian IPOs 
 
      M/V V/B LnPC LnOS LnTA   
Adj. 
R2 
  
F-
Value 
  
Y t α β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 N 
Panel A: Δ Total Assets 
        P/S 
Multiple 
1 0.813*** 0.000 0.000 1.120*** 9.720*** -0.096*** 0.51 64.42 1731 
 (7.92) (0.4) (0.42) (25.86) (6.96) (-10.13)    
2 0.990*** 0.000 0.000 1.242*** 4.808*** -0.090*** 0.44 45.74 1636 
  (7.5) (0.35) (-0.11) (20.16) (5.87) (-7.36)    
 
3 0.956*** 0.000 0.000 1.429*** 3.316*** -0.072*** 0.42 38.66 1549 
  (5.94) (0.62) (0.00) (18.38) (6.19) (-4.83)    
 
4 0.846*** 0.000 0.000 1.729*** 5.627*** -0.052*** 0.38 31.87 1466 
  (4.42) (0.14) (-0.27) (15.28) (6.43) (-2.96)    
           P/EBITDA 
Multiple 
1 0.808*** -0.001* 0.001** 1.126*** 9.667*** -0.094*** 0.52 64.74 1721 
 (7.89) (-1.66) (2.15) (26.15) (6.95) (-10)    
2 0.979*** -0.001** 0.001*** 1.240*** 4.572*** -0.088*** 0.45 46.35 1627 
  (7.46) (-1.84) (2.62) (20.26) (5.61) (-7.23)    
 
3 0.936*** -0.001* 0.001* 1.434*** 3.291*** -0.069*** 0.42 38.89 1540 
  (5.84) (-1.67) (1.78) (18.54) (6.18) (-4.66)    
 
4 0.833*** 0.000 0.000 1.715*** 5.422*** -0.050*** 0.38 31.74 1457 
  (4.36) (-0.74) (0.99) (15.15) (6.2) (-2.87)    
           P/E 
Multiple 
1 0.818*** 0.000 0.001*** 1.118*** 9.708*** -0.095*** 0.51 62.12 1722 
 (7.99) (0.72) (2.97) (25.4) (6.94) (-10.04)    
2 0.995*** 0.000 0.001*** 1.247*** 4.921*** -0.089*** 0.45 46.64 1628 
  (7.58) (0.8) (3.45) (20.38) (6.04) (-7.3)    
 
3 0.943*** 0.000 0.001*** 1.446*** 3.383*** -0.069*** 0.42 39.24 1542 
  (5.88) (0.46) (2.8) (18.57) (6.34) (-4.69)    
 
4 0.834*** 0.000 0.001** 1.754*** 5.758*** -0.051*** 0.39 32.17 1459 
  (4.36) (-0.25) (1.95) (15.38) (6.57) (-2.91)    
           
Panel B: Δ Inventory 
        P/S 
Multiple 
1 0.518** 0.000 0.001*** 0.368*** -3.239 -0.050** 0.07 4.09 1464 
 (2.2) (0.13) (3.51) (3.25) (-0.61) (-2.38)    
2 0.864*** -0.001 0.001*** 0.702*** 6.988** -0.048* 0.09 5.05 1386 
  (2.98) (-1.2) (3.1) (4.00) (2.04) (-1.85)    
 
3 1.005*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.507** -1.588 -0.074*** 0.11 5.38 1297 
  (3.06) (0.43) (2.98) (2.21) (-0.51) (-2.51)    
 
4 0.623 0.001 0.001** 0.278 -4.283 -0.079** 0.10 4.81 1234 
  (1.58) (0.91) (2.44) (0.96) (-1.51) (-2.25)    
           P/EBITDA 
Multiple 
1 0.562** 0.000 0.001** 0.372*** -4.036 -0.052** 0.07 3.82 1461 
 (2.38) (-0.74) (2.35) (3.29) (-0.76) (-2.46)    
2 0.930*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.699*** 7.021** -0.050** 0.09 4.91 1383 
  (3.2) (-0.64) (2.99) (3.98) (2.06) (-1.94)    
 
3 1.022*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.478** -2.142 -0.076*** 0.10 5.22 1294 
  (3.11) (-0.22) (2.74) (2.09) (-0.68) (-2.58)    
 
4 0.634 -0.001* 0.001*** 0.302 -4.595* -0.079** 0.10 4.95 1231 
  (1.61) (-1.73)* (2.96) (1.04) (-1.62) (-2.26)    
           P/E 
Multiple 
1 0.530** 0.000 0.001*** 0.379*** -3.031 -0.050** 0.07 3.98 1462 
 (2.25) (0.19) (3.07) (3.35) (-0.57) (-2.37)    
2 0.878*** 0.000 0.001** 0.710*** 7.449** -0.050* 0.09 4.86 1385 
  (3.02) (-0.89) (2.4) (4.04) (2.19) (-1.93)    
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3 1.010*** 0.000 0.001** 0.507** -1.912 -0.075** 0.10 5.25 1296 
  (3.07) (-0.77) (2.35) (2.21) (-0.61) (-2.56)    
 
4 0.617 0.000 0.001* 0.371 -4.027 -0.076** 0.10 4.64 1232 
  (1.57) (-0.67) (1.74) (1.28) (-1.42) (-2.15)    
           
Panel C: Δ Cash 
        P/S  
Multiple 
1 0.777* 0.000 0.000 2.680*** 62.969*** -0.123*** 0.27 21.55 1697 
 (1.64) (-0.06) (0.49) (13.29) (9.53) (-2.82)    
2 0.556 0.000 0.000 2.197*** 17.542*** -0.093** 0.23 16.76 1600 
  (1.12) (-0.65) (-0.34) (9.41) (5.63) (-2.03)    
 
3 0.128 0.150** 0.000 2.494*** 8.337*** -0.013 0.22 15 1511 
  (0.24) (2.14) (0.30) (9.57) (4.71) (-0.26)    
 
4 -0.506 0.230** 0.000 3.282*** 16.751*** -0.006 0.22 13.83 1422 
  (-0.91) (2.51) (-0.28) (9.62) (6.43) (-0.13)    
           P/EBITDA 
Multiple 
1 0.824* 0.000 0.001** 2.705*** 63.297*** -0.125*** 0.27 21.81 1687 
 (1.74) (-0.21) (2.13) (13.43) (9.6) (-2.86)    
2 0.635 0.002*** 0.001 2.227*** 17.501*** -0.096** 0.23 16.92 1591 
  (1.28) (2.64) (0.97) (9.55) (5.62) (-2.09)    
 
3 0.247 0.002** 0.000 2.522** 8.433*** -0.019 0.22 15.04 1502 
  (0.47) (2.32) (0.74) (9.69) (4.77) (-0.4)    
 
4 -0.364 0.001*** 0.000 3.234*** 16.667*** -0.020 0.22 13.6 1413 
  (-0.65) (0.97) (-0.28) (9.45) (6.4) (-0.39)    
           P/E 
Multiple 
1 0.785* 0.001** 0.001* 2.724*** 63.800*** -0.122*** 0.27 21.45 1688 
 (1.66) (2.23) (1.87) (13.23) (9.59) (-2.78)    
2 0.594 0.001** 0.001* 2.237*** 17.195*** -0.095** 0.23 16.99 1592 
  (1.20) (2.24) (1.76) (9.59) (5.52) (-2.07)    
 
3 0.170 0.001 0.001 2.487*** 8.348*** -0.018 0.22 15.08 1506 
  (0.32) (1.02) (1.21) (9.53) (4.71) (-0.38)    
 
4 -0.436 0.000 0.001 3.259*** 16.769*** -0.018 0.22 13.89 1417 
  (-0.78) (0.48) (0.89) (9.55) (6.44) (-0.35)    
           
Panel D: ΣCAPEX 
        P/S  
Multiple 
1 0.411*** 0.000 0.000 0.123*** -2.231** -0.046*** 0.15 10.42 1731 
 (5.78) (0.64) (1.27) (4.1) (-2.31) (-7.1)    
2 0.530*** 0.000 0.000 0.316*** 0.743 -0.059*** 0.20 15.22 1731 
  (5.83) (0.38) (0.8) (7.74) (1.34) (-7.1)    
 
3 0.690*** 0.000 0.000 0.357*** 0.706** -0.069*** 0.21 15.75 1731 
  (6.44) (0.15) (0.84) (7.59) (2.03) (-6.98)    
 
4 0.698*** 0.000 0.000 0.379*** 0.506 -0.067*** 0.20 15.3 1730 
  (5.62) (1.36) (0.49) (6.04) (0.97) (-5.84)    
           P/EBITDA 
Multiple 
1 0.404*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.128*** -2.290** -0.045*** 0.15 10.8 1721 
 (5.74) (-0.75) (3.32) (4.32) (-2.4) (-6.95)    
2 0.527*** 0.000 0.001** 0.313*** 0.595 -0.059*** 0.20 15.32 1721 
  (5.83) (0.50) (2.39) (7.73) (1.08) (-7.06)    
 
3 0.675*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.362*** 0.698** -0.066*** 0.21 15.74 1721 
  (6.36) (0.22) (2.57) (7.8) (2.03) (-6.78)    
 
4 0.682*** 0.000 0.001** 0.375*** 0.381 -0.064*** 0.20 15.16 1720 
  (5.53) (-0.39) (2.04) (6.06) (0.74) (-5.63)    
           P/E  
Multiple 
1 0.406*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.132*** -1.856* -0.045*** 0.15 10.87 1722 
 (5.78) (1.03) (3.39) (4.36) (-1.93) (-6.94)    
2 0.519*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.354*** 1.262** -0.058*** 0.21 16.14 1722 
  (5.75) (0.62) (2.67) (8.55) (2.26) (-7.02)    
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3 0.672*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.405*** 0.950*** -0.067*** 0.22 16.63 1722 
  (6.29) (0.8) (2.7) (8.46) (2.72) (-6.81)    
 
4 0.664*** 0.000 0.001** 0.460*** 1.001* -0.064*** 0.21 15.99 1721 
  (5.36) (0.18) (2.00) (7.12) (1.89) (-5.61)    
           
Panel E: ΣR&D 
        P/S  
Multiple 
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.05 3.16 1731 
 (0.29) (-0.2) (-0.07) (0.07) (-0.15) (0.12)    
2 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.005*** -0.215*** 0.000 0.13 9.39 1731 
  (0.3) (-0.35) (0.25) (-3.42) (-11.1) (-0.14)    
 
3 0.005 0.000 0.000 -0.013*** -0.278*** 0.000 0.22 17.35 1731 
  (0.91) (-0.35) (0.32) (-5.71) (-16.9) (-0.64)    
 
4 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.018 0.000 0.08 5.6 1730 
  
(0.15) (-0.25) (-0.1) (0.66) (-0.61) (0.66) 
   P/EBITDA 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.05 3.15 1721 
  (0.3) (-0.25) (0.21) (0.07) (-0.16) (0.12)    
 
2 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.005*** -0.227*** 0.000 0.15 10.3 1721 
  (0.32) (-0.45) (0.17) (-3.88) (-11.93) (-0.12)    
 
3 0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.013*** -0.279**** 0.000 0.23 18.28 1721 
  (0.88) (-0.54) (0.25) (-5.89) (-17.38) (-0.54)    
 
4 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.033 0.000 0.09 5.97 1720 
  (0.17) (-0.52) (0.21) (0.32) (-1.11) (0.73)    
           P/E 
Multiple 
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.05 3.15 1722 
 (0.31) (0.53) (0.07) (0.08) (-0.16) (0.11)    
2 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.005*** -0.219*** 0.000 0.13 9.42 1722 
  (0.36) (0.48) (-0.08) (-3.5) (-11.11) (-0.22)    
 
3 0.005 0.000 0.000 -0.013*** -0.282*** 0.000 0.22 17.36 1722 
  (0.97) (0.39) (0.00) (-5.85) (-16.9) (-0.69)    
 
4 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 -0.017 0.000 0.08 5.58 1721 
  (0.16) (0.54) (0.02) (0.69) (-0.54) (0.66)    
           
Panel F: ΣDebt Reduction 
        P/S  
Multiple 
1 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.106 0.002 0.01 0.62 1731 
 (0.86) (-0.65) (-0.9) (1.64) (0.57) (1.37)    
2 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.021*** 0.010 0.002 0.02 1.01 1731 
  (0.28) (-0.69) (-1.12) (2.65) (0.09) (1.37)    
 
3 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.046*** 0.049 0.001 0.03 2.05 1731 
  (1.06) (-0.62) (-1.53) (3.39) (0.49) (0.48)    
 
4 0.084* 0.000 0.000 0.133*** 0.546*** 0.000 0.07 4.58 1730 
  (1.71) (-0.44) (0.39) (5.4) (2.66) (0.02)    
           P/EBITDA 
Multiple 
1 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.103 0.002 0.01 0.6 1721 
 (0.92) (0.9) (0.17) (1.53) (0.55) (1.29)    
2 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.021** 0.009 0.002 0.02 0.95 1721 
  (0.36) (-0.01) (-0.37) (2.56) (0.08) (1.26)    
 
3 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.044*** 0.045 0.001 0.03 1.99 1721 
  (1.08) (-0.47) (-0.21) (3.29) (0.45) (0.42)    
 
4 0.086** 0.000 0.000 0.136*** 0.561*** 0.000 0.07 4.62 1720 
  (1.76) (-0.62) (0.76) (5.5) (2.73) (-0.04)    
           P/E 
Multiple 
1 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.112 0.002 0.01 0.64 1722 
 (0.85) (0.98) (0.89) (1.61) (0.6) (1.36)    
2 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.019** 0.096 0.003** 0.01 0.9 1722 
  (0.11) (-0.62) (0.34) (2.36) (0.9) (1.77)    
 
3 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.040*** 0.055 0.002 0.03 1.98 1722 
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  (1.02) (0.04) (1.45) (2.94) (0.55) (0.63)    
 
4 0.081* 0.000 0.001* 0.139*** 0.618*** 0.000 0.07 4.66 1721 
  (1.65) (0.04) (1.65) (5.46) (2.96) (0.11)    
           
Industry and 
Time FE 
Yes 
Notes: This table reports the regression results for IPOs showing the impact of two components of M/B ratio – 
M/V and V/B (computed on the basis of P/S, P/EBITDA and P/E multiples on an industry peer) on the post-issue 
changes in assets and expenditures. We regress changes in six accounting variables i.e. cash, inventory, total 
assets, capital expenditure, R&D and reduction in long-term debt measured over four years post-issue, +1, +2, 
+3, and +4 year. Precisely, the equation is stated as follows: 
 
Where Yit = ((Sit – Si0)/Ai0) for Sit = inventory, cash and total assets, for i
th
 firm and for t=1 to 4 years. Yit = 
( /Ai0) for Si = Capital expenditures, R&D and long-term debt reduction, for i
th
 firm and for j =1 to 4 
years. (M/V)i and (V/B)i are price-to-value and value-to-book components of the IPO firm i that are computed 
based on pricing multiples of the industry peer. PCi = Primary Capital raised (Offer Price * No. of shares issued) 
for i
th
 firm, OSCi = Other sources of capital (Total Funds – PCi) for i
th 
firm. Total sources of funds are sum of 
funds from operations, financing and investment activities. Ai0 = Total Assets at time zero for i
th
 firm. T and I 
are year and industry dummies respectively. Ln[(PCi/Ai0)+1], Ln[(OSCi/Ai0)+1] and Ln[Ai0] are controls 
variables in the regression. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis below the co-efficient value and have been 
estimated using clustered standard errors. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. N is 
the number of SEOs in a yearly regression. 
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Table 5 
Effect of mispricing and growth opportunities on post-issue changes in assets and expenditures for Indian SEOs 
 
   
M/V V/B 
Primary 
Capital 
Other 
Capital 
LnTA  
Adj. 
R2 
 
F-
Value 
 
Y t α β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 N 
           
ΔTotal  
Assets 
1 0.259*** 0.000 0.009** 0.507*** 6.241*** -0.008 0.26 7.28 633 
 (3.33) (0.09) (2.44) (7.61) (3.75) (-1.58)    
2 0.412*** 0.000 0.016*** 0.732*** 4.659*** -0.013 0.24 6.71 633 
  (3.63) (-1.57) (3.08) (7.75) (4.52) -1.7600    
 
3 0.366** 0.000 0.027*** 0.923*** 3.280*** -0.011 0.27 7.45 626 
  (2.49) (-0.94) (4.13) (8.29) (4.89) (-1.15)    
 
4 0.637*** 0.000 0.020** 0.687*** 1.194*** -0.018 0.26 4.85 425 
  (3.07) (`0.07) (2.21) (4.86) (2.72) (-1.3)    
           ΔInventory 1 0.295 -0.001* 0.012 -0.109 -8.172* -0.030** 0.10 1.92 558 
  (1.43) (-1.93) (1.28) (-0.59) (-1.93) (-2.21)    
 
2 0.870*** -0.001 0.007 -0.555** -2.938 -0.075*** 0.09 1.71 558 
  (2.9) (-1.14) (0.55) (-2.11) (-1.12) (-3.71)    
 
3 1.017*** -0.001 0.021 0.235 0.321 -0.067*** 0.10 2.02 549 
  (2.91) (-0.52) (1.25) (0.78) (0.21) (-3.00)    
 
4 0.972** 0.000 -0.013 0.405 0.774 -0.050* 0.16 2.3 371 
  (2.26) (0.00) (-0.58) (1.14) (0.81) (-1.75)    
           ΔCash 1 -0.047 0.000 -0.001 1.558*** 28.814*** 0.018 0.10 2.27 631 
  (-0.13) (-0.41) (-0.07) (5.01) (3.71) (0.76)    
 
2 -0.008 0.000 0.008 1.180*** 9.051*** 0.023 0.09 2.15 631 
  (-0.02) (-0.43) (0.42) (3.64) (2.56) (0.88)    
 
3 -0.481 0.000 0.019 1.836*** 7.437*** 0.028 0.13 3.15 622 
  (-1.08) (0.5) (0.94) (5.49) (3.69) (0.99)    
 
4 -1.196** 0.001** 0.029 1.997*** 3.224** 0.080** 0.16 2.63 423 
  (-1.96) (2.25) (1.09) (4.84) (2.51) (2.00)    
           ΣCAPEX 1 0.124** 0.000 0.004* 0.173*** 2.970*** -0.005 0.13 3.04 633 
  (2.55) (-1.54) (1.92) (4.13) (2.83) (-1.47)    
 
2 0.264*** 0.001* 0.004 0.248*** 1.917*** -0.015*** 0.19 4.88 633 
  (3.77) (1.78) (1.07) (4.24) (3.01) (-3.25)    
 
3 0.360*** 0.000 0.005 0.303*** 1.384*** -0.021*** 0.22 5.97 633 
  (4.28) (-1.59) (1.16) (4.52) (3.42) (-3.8)    
 
4 0.452*** 0.001* 0.005 0.325*** 0.837*** -0.027*** 0.27 7.87 633 
  (4.93) (1.85) (1.25) (4.71) (3.51) (-4.42)    
           ΣR&D 1 0.014** 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.139 -0.001** 0.04 0.87 633 
  (1.99) (-0.81) (0.28) (0.87) (0.94) (-2.11)    
 
2 0.025* 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.082 -0.002* 0.04 0.91 633 
  (1.88) (-0.76) (0.32) (0.64) (0.67) (-1.94)    
 
3 0.031* 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.049 -0.002 0.05 1.01 633 
  (1.63) (-0.7) (0.28) (0.54) (0.54) (-1.57)    
 
4 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.027 -0.001 0.06 1.31 633 
  (1.20) (-0.62) (0.22) (0.55) (0.52) (-1.00)    
           ΣDebt  
Reduction 
1 0.046*** 0.000 -0.001 0.006 0.213 -0.002** 0.11 2.69 633 
 (3.26) (-0.42) (-1.12) (0.49) (0.7) (-2.46)    
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2 0.085*** 0.001** 0.000 0.044*** -0.108 -0.005*** 0.16 3.84 633 
  (4.17) (2.13) (-0.26) (2.59) (-0.58) (-3.63)    
 
3 0.168*** 0.000 -0.001 0.052** 0.059 -0.011*** 0.13 2.97 633 
  (5.61) (0.35) (-0.96) (2.2) (0.41) (-5.42)    
 
4 0.184*** 0.000 -0.001 0.030 -0.003 -0.012*** 0.17 4.14 633 
  (5.51) (0.17) (-0.54) (1.21) (-0.03) (-5.48)    
Industry and 
Time FE 
Yes 
Notes: This table reports the regression results for SEOs showing the impact of two components of M/B ratio – 
M/V and V/B (computed on the basis of Ohlson (1990) and Elliot et al. (2008) Residual Income Model) on the 
post-issue changes in assets and expenditures. We regress changes in six accounting variables i.e. cash, 
inventory, total assets, capital expenditure, R&D and reduction in long-term debt measured over four years post-
issue, +1, +2, +3, and +4 year. Fair value of equity is calculated by using residual income model. Precisely, 
the equation is stated as follows: 
 
Where Yit = ((Sit – Si0)/Ai0) for Sit = inventory, cash and total assets, for i
th
 firm and for t=1 to 4 years. Yit = 
( /Ai0) for Si = Capital expenditures, R&D and long-term debt reduction, for i
th
 firm and for  j =1 to 4 
years. (M/V)i and (V/B)i are price-to-value and value-to-book components of IPO firm i  that are computed based 
on pricing multiples of the industry peer. PCi = Primary Capital raised (Offer Price * No. of shares issued) for i
th
 
firm, OSCi = Other sources of capital (Total Funds – PCi) for i
th 
firm. Total sources of funds are sum of funds 
from operations, financing and investment activities. Ai0 = Total Assets at time zero for i
th
 firm. T and I are year 
and industry dummies respectively. Ln[(PCi/Ai0)+1], Ln[(OSCi/Ai0)+1] and Ln[Ai0] are controls variables in the 
regression. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis below the co-efficient value and have been estimated using 
clustered standard errors. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. N is the number of 
SEOs in a yearly regression. 
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Table 6 
Calendar time factor regressions of high vs. low mispriced (market-to-value – M/V) Indian IPOs based on price multiples of their industry peers 
 
Panel A   1       2       3   
 
High M/V based on P/S multiple 
 
Low M/V based on P/S multiple 
 
Difference between High M/V and 
Low M/V based on P/S multiple 
  CAPM 
Fama 
French 
Carhart   CAPM 
Fama 
French 
Carhart   CAPM 
Fama 
French 
Carhart 
Intercept -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 
-0.07*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
(-4.70) (-3.64) (-3.16) 
 
(-3.68) (-3.03) (-2.77) 
 
(-1.38) (-1.60) (-1.64) 
Rm-Rf 0.93*** 0.96*** 0.97***  
0.92*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 
 
-0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 
(52.86) (68.02) (65.85) 
 
(28.72) (38.91) (41.08) 
 
(-0.79) (-0.96) (-1.08) 
SMB 
 
-0.14*** -0.13*** 
  
-0.17*** -0.16*** 
  
0.01 0.01 
  
(-7.19) (-5.77) 
  
(-4.16) (-4.27) 
  
(0.52) (0.59) 
HML 
 
-0.07*** -0.06** 
  
-0.09* -0.08 
  
0.01 0.01 
  
(-3.36) (-2.19) 
  
(-1.73) (-1.63) 
  
(0.40) (0.53) 
MOM 
  
0.10 
   
0.10 
   
0.01 
   
(1.35) 
   
(0.75) 
   
(0.13) 
Adj. R2 0.953 0.962 0.963 
 
0.859 0.870 0.871 
 
0.002 0.003 0.003 
F-Statistic 2809.63 1663.11 1161.03 
 
827.9 635.93 451.17 
 
0.63 0.51 0.41 
Panel B   1       2       3   
 
High M/V based on P/EBITDA 
multiple  
Low M/V based on P/EBITDA 
multiple  
Difference between High M/V and 
Low M/V based on P/EBITDA 
multiple 
  CAPM 
Fama 
French 
Carhart   CAPM 
Fama 
French 
Carhart   CAPM 
Fama 
French 
Carhart 
Intercept -0.08*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 
-0.06*** -0.04*** -0.03** 
 
-0.02** -0.01 -0.01 
 
(-4.78) (-3.72) (-3.30) 
 
(-3.69) (-2.74) (-2.55) 
 
(-2.09) (-0.94) (-1.06) 
Rm-Rf 0.91*** 0.95*** 0.96***  
0.94*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 
 
-0.02* -0.01 -0.01 
 
(44.80) (60.39) (58.16) 
 
(42.14) (48.07) (49.15) 
 
(-1.77) (-1.08) (-1.34) 
SMB 
 
-0.18*** -0.16*** 
  
-0.11*** -0.10*** 
  
-0.06** -0.06** 
  
(-5.76) (-4.85) 
  
(-5.02) (-4.32) 
  
(-2.18) (-1.99) 
HML 
 
-0.06** -0.05 
  
-0.08** -0.07** 
  
0.02 0.02 
  
(-2.52) (-1.61) 
  
(-2.53) (-2.39) 
  
(0.76) (0.74) 
MOM 
  
0.10 
   
0.08 
   
0.00 
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(1.14) 
   
(0.72) 
   
(0.03) 
Adj. R2 0.932 0.945 0.946 
 
0.939 0.945 0.946 
 
0.010 0.060 0.060 
F-Statistic 2017.19 1331.49 903.7 
 
1782.86 809.16 617.9 
 
3.17 7.43 5.7 
Panel C   1       2       3   
 
High M/V based on P/E multiple 
 
Low M/V based on P/E multiple 
 
Difference between High M/V and 
Low M/V based on P/E multiple 
  CAPM 
Fama 
French 
Carhart   CAPM 
Fama 
French 
Carhart   CAPM 
Fama 
French 
Carhart 
Intercept -0.07*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 
-0.07*** -0.04*** -0.03*** 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(-4.78) (-3.73) (-3.42) 
 
(-4.03) (-2.98) (-2.61) 
 
(-0.20) (-0.35) (-0.33) 
Rm-Rf 0.92*** 0.95*** 0.95***  
0.93*** 0.96*** 0.97*** 
 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
(48.63) (60.02) (58.34) 
 
(40.34) (49.46) (47.64) 
 
(-0.77) (-1.01) (-0.92) 
SMB 
 
-0.14*** -0.13*** 
  
-0.15*** -0.13*** 
  
0.01 0.01 
  
(-6.04) (-5.44) 
  
(-4.77) (-4.59) 
  
(0.20) (0.22) 
HML 
 
-0.05** -0.04 
  
-0.09** -0.08** 
  
0.04 0.04 
  
(-2.42) (-1.65) 
  
(-2.51) (-2.13) 
  
(1.13) (1.25) 
MOM 
  
0.07 
   
0.11 
   
0.00 
   
(1.06) 
   
(0.86) 
   
(0.00) 
Adj. R2 0.941 0.949 0.950 
 
0.932 0.942 0.943 
 
0.002 0.012 0.012 
F-Statistic 2376.13 1277.07 991.01 
 
1634.31 885.18 581.84 
 
0.6 1.37 1.2 
 
Notes: Panels A1, B1 and C1 and Panel A2, B2 and C2 of this table reports the regression results of the following equation for high M/V IPOs and low M/V IPOs 
respectively, computed on the basis of P/S (Panel A), P/EBITDA (Panel B) and P/E (Panel C) multiple of industry peer: 
 
Panels A3, B3 and C3 of this table reports the regression results of the following regression for the difference in the performance of high and low M/V IPOs computed on the 
basis of P/S (Panel A), P/EBITDA (Panel B) and P/E (Panel C) multiple of industry peer: 
 
 is the monthly portfolio returns calculated for the month t and  is the one year risk-free rate. We construct equally-weighted portfolios of firms that issued IPOs in the 
previous three years and belong to a specific median for every month from 1991 to 2012.  is the market risk premium,  is the market return for the month t, 
which is CNX Nifty Index return.  is the monthly return on the portfolio of small stocks minus large stocks.  is the monthly return on the portfolio of high book-
to-market minus low book-to-market returns.  is the momentum factor which is returns on the portfolio of high momentum stocks (high past returns i.e. winners) minus 
low momentum stocks (low past returns i.e. losers). Momentum is computed on the basis of previous one year returns.  is the monthly portfolio returns of IPOs 
having high M/V ratio for the month t.  is the monthly portfolio returns of IPOs having low M/V ratio for the month t. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis below 
the co-efficient value and have been estimated using clustered standard errors. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Table 7 
Calendar time factor regressions of high vs. low growth (value-to-book – V/B) Indian IPOs based on price multiples of their industry peers 
 
Panel A   1       2       3   
 
High V/B based on P/S multiple 
 
Low V/B based on P/S multiple 
 
Difference between High V/B and 
Low V/B based on P/S multiple 
  CAPM 
Fama 
French 
Carhart   CAPM 
Fama 
French 
Carhart   CAPM 
Fama 
French 
Carhart 
Intercept -0.07*** -0.04*** -0.04** 
 
-0.06*** -0.04*** -0.03*** 
 
0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
(-4.09) (-2.64) (-2.12) 
 
(-4.37) (-3.55) (-3.09) 
 
(1.17) (1.42) (1.47) 
Rm-Rf 0.92*** 0.96*** 0.97***  
0.94*** 0.96*** 0.97*** 
 
0.02 0.02 0.02 
 
(30.05) (34.51) (34.20) 
 
(53.46) (69.28) (65.72) 
 
(0.87) (0.88) (1.02) 
SMB 
 
-0.17*** -0.15*** 
  
-0.14*** -0.12*** 
  
-0.01 0.00 
  
(-5.30) (-4.20) 
  
(-5.44) (-4.73) 
  
(-0.36) (-0.11) 
HML 
 
-0.10*** -0.08** 
  
-0.07** -0.06* 
  
-0.01 0.00 
  
(-2.85) (-2.07) 
  
(-2.21) (-1.71) 
  
(-0.30) (-0.12) 
MOM 
  
0.17 
   
0.08 
   
0.04 
   
(1.05) 
   
(1.12) 
   
(0.42) 
Adj. R2 0.835 0.845 0.848 
 
0.954 0.962 0.962 
 
0.002 0.002 0.003 
F-Statistic 906.93 418.7 320.57 
 
2871.31 1688.8 1105.34 
 
0.76 0.29 0.31 
Panel B   1       2       3   
 
High V/B based on P/EBITDA 
multiple  
Low V/B based on P/EBITDA 
multiple  
Difference between High V/B and 
Low V/B based on P/EBITDA 
multiple 
  CAPM 
Fama 
French 
Carhart   CAPM 
Fama 
French 
Carhart   CAPM 
Fama 
French 
Carhart 
Intercept -0.08*** -0.05** -0.04** 
 
-0.06*** -0.04*** -0.03*** 
 
-0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 
(-3.54) (-2.41) (-2.19) 
 
(-4.70) (-3.44) (-3.10) 
 
(-0.88) (-1.07) (-1.04) 
Rm-Rf 0.91*** 0.95*** 0.97***  
0.93*** 0.96*** 0.97*** 
 
0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 
(27.44) (31.49) (33.99) 
 
(52.87) (66.50) (63.33) 
 
(-0.08) (-0.39) (-0.27) 
SMB 
 
-0.16*** -0.13*** 
  
-0.15*** -0.14*** 
  
0.04 0.05 
  
(-4.24) (-3.30) 
  
(-5.27) (-4.48) 
  
(1.38) (1.37) 
HML 
 
-0.17*** -0.15*** 
  
-0.05 -0.04 
  
-0.03 -0.03 
  
(-3.40) (-3.04) 
  
(-1.59) (-1.21) 
  
(-1.40) (-1.19) 
MOM 
  
0.18 
   
0.07 
   
0.05 
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(1.21) 
   
(0.78) 
   
(0.58) 
Adj. R2 0.858 0.872 0.875 
 
0.950 0.960 0.960 
 
0.000 0.024 0.026 
F-Statistic 755.37 439.29 419.71 
 
2810.5 1526.29 1040.78 
 
0.01 1.92 1.35 
Panel C   1       2       3   
 
High V/B based on P/E multiple 
 
Low V/B based on P/E multiple 
 
Difference between High V/B and 
Low V/B based on P/E multiple 
  CAPM 
Fama 
French 
Carhart   CAPM 
Fama 
French 
Carhart   CAPM 
Fama 
French 
Carhart 
Intercept -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.05** 
 
-0.07*** -0.04*** -0.03*** 
 
0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 
(-3.67) (-2.65) (-2.57) 
 
(-4.75) (-3.59) (-3.03) 
 
(-0.20) (-0.81) (-0.92) 
Rm-Rf 0.93*** 0.96*** 0.96***  
0.93*** 0.96*** 0.97*** 
 
0.01 0.00 0.00 
 
(31.82) (34.77) (36.20) 
 
(52.51 (68.77) (61.80) 
 
(0.53) (-0.07) (-0.17) 
SMB 
 
-0.14*** -0.13*** 
  
-0.16*** -0.14*** 
  
0.05 0.05 
  
(-4.60) (-4.46) 
  
(-5.67) (-4.57) 
  
(1.51) (1.34) 
HML 
 
-0.09*** -0.08** 
  
-0.07** -0.05 
  
0.01 0.01 
  
(-2.66) (-2.51) 
  
(-2.21) (-1.61) 
  
(0.59) (0.49) 
MOM 
  
0.07 
   
0.10 
   
-0.03 
   
(0.59) 
   
(1.10) 
   
(-0.28) 
Adj. R2 0.914 0.922 0.922 
 
0.948 0.958 0.959 
 
0.001 0.025 0.026 
F-Statistic 1015.65 416.48 404.99 
 
2771.85 1612.46 988.36 
 
0.29 1.2 0.88 
 
Notes: Panels A1, B1 and C1 and Panel A2, B2 and C2 of this table reports the regression results of the following equation for high M/V IPOs and low M/V IPOs 
respectively, computed on the basis of P/S (Panel A), P/EBITDA (Panel B) and P/E (Panel C) multiple of industry peer: 
 
Panels A3, B3 and C3 of this table reports the regression results of the following regression for the difference in the performance of high and low V/B IPOs computed on the 
basis of P/S (Panel A), P/EBITDA (Panel B) and P/E (Panel C) multiple of industry peer: 
 
 is the monthly portfolio returns calculated for the month t and  is the one year risk-free rate. We construct equally-weighted portfolios of firms that issued IPOs in the 
previous three years and belong to a specific median for every month from 1991 to 2012.  is the market risk premium,  is the market return for the month t, 
which is CNX Nifty Index return.  is the monthly return on the portfolio of small stocks minus large stocks.  is the monthly return on the portfolio of high book-
to-market minus low book-to-market returns.  is the momentum factor which is returns on the portfolio of high momentum stocks (high past returns i.e. winners) minus 
low momentum stocks (low past returns i.e. losers). Momentum is computed on the basis of previous one year returns.  is the monthly portfolio returns of IPOs 
having high V/B ratio for the month t.  is the monthly portfolio returns of IPOs having low V/B ratio for the month t. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis below the 
co-efficient value and have been estimated using clustered standard errors. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Table 8 
Calendar time factor regressions of high vs. low mispriced (market-to-value – M/V) and high vs. low growth (value-to-book – V/B) Indian SEOs 
 
Panel A 
 
1 
   
2 
   
3 
 
 
High M/V SEOs 
 
Low M/V SEOs 
 
Difference between High M/V and 
Low M/V SEOs 
  CAPM Fama French Carhart 
 
CAPM Fama French Carhart 
 
CAPM Fama French Carhart 
Intercept -0.13** -0.10* -0.10* 
 
-0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 
(-2.54) (-1.83) (-1.84) 
 
(-0.39) (0.38) (0.41) 
 
(-0.85) (-0.74) (-0.72) 
Rm-Rf 0.77*** 0.80*** 0.80***  
1.01*** 1.03*** 1.03*** 
 
-0.01 -0.01 0.00 
 
(9.85) (9.95) (9.78) 
 
(44.48) (44.03) (43.39) 
 
(-0.26) (-0.16) (-0.13) 
SMB 
 
-0.19 -0.19 
  
-0.07** -0.07* 
  
-0.01 -0.01 
  
(-1.6) (-1.58) 
  
(-2.03) (-1.84) 
  
(-0.16) (-0.1) 
HML 
 
-0.14 -0.14 
  
0.05 0.05 
  
-0.09* -0.08 
  
(-1.24) (-1.25) 
  
(1.52) (1.54) 
  
(-1.76) (-1.65) 
MOM 
  
-0.05 
   
0.02 
   
0.02 
   
(-0.21) 
   
(0.29) 
   
(0.17) 
Adj. R2 0.2902 0.293 0.2901 
 
0.8934 0.8974 0.897 
 
-0.004 0.0027 -0.0015 
F-Statistic 97.08 33.46 25.00 
 
1978.42 689.3 514.96 
 
0.07 1.22 0.91 
Panel B   1 
   
2 
   
3 
 
 
High V/B SEOs 
 
Low V/B SEOs 
 
Difference between High V/B and Low 
V/B SEOs 
  CAPM Fama-French Carhart 
 
CAPM Fama-French Carhart 
 
CAPM Fama French Carhart 
Intercept 0.01 0.02 0.02 
 
-0.04*** -0.02** -0.02* 
 
0.01 0.02 0.02 
 
(1.02) (1.37) (1.46) 
 
(-2.7) (-1.7) (-1.71) 
 
(0.41) (1.08) (1.36) 
Rm-Rf 1.03*** 1.04*** 1.05***  
0.99*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
 
-0.02 -0.01 0.00 
 
(48.71) (47.41) (47.29) 
 
(49.43) (48.38) (47.44) 
 
(-1) (-0.37) (0.13) 
SMB 
 
-0.04 -0.02 
  
-0.07** -0.07** 
  
-0.07* -0.05 
  
(-1.19) (-0.65) 
  
(-2.16) (-2.13) 
  
(-1.95) (-1.23) 
HML 
 
-0.01 0.01 
  
0.02 0.02 
  
-0.10*** -0.08** 
  
(-0.25) (0.16) 
  
(0.76) (0.7) 
  
(-2.79) (-2.17) 
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MOM 
  
0.10 
   
-0.01 
   
0.19** 
   
(1.51) 
   
(-0.19) 
   
(2.49) 
Adj. R2 0.9095 0.9093 0.9098 
 
0.9129 0.9154 0.915 
 
0 0.0263 0.0477 
F-Statistic 2372.54 789.71 596.07 
 
2443.76 841.25 628.31 
 
1.01 3.1 3.92 
Notes: Panels A1 and B1 and Panels A2 and B2 of this table reports the following regression results of the equation for high and low M/V SEOs and high and low V/B SEOs 
respectively, computed on the basis of residual income model: 
 
Panels A3 (and B3) of this table reports the regression results of the following regression for the difference in the performance of high M/V (and V/B) SEOs and low M/V (and 
V/B) SEOs: 
 
 is the monthly portfolio returns calculated for the month t and  is the one year risk-free rate. We construct equally-weighted portfolios of firms that issued 
SEOs in the previous three years and belong to a specific median for every month from 1991 to 2012.  is the market risk premium,  is the market 
return for the month t, which is CNX Nifty Index return.  is the monthly return on the portfolio of small stocks minus large stocks.  is the monthly return 
on the portfolio of high book-to-market minus low book-to-market returns.  is the momentum factor which is returns on the portfolio of high momentum 
stocks (high past returns i.e. winners) minus low momentum stocks (low past returns i.e. losers). Momentum is computed on the basis of previous one year returns. 
 is the monthly portfolio returns of SEOs having high M/V or V/B ratio for the month t.  is the monthly portfolio returns of SEOs having low M/V or 
V/B ratio for the month t. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis below the co-efficient value and have been estimated using clustered standard errors. ***, ** and * 
represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Table 9A 
Effect of mispricing and growth opportunities on post-issue changes in assets and expenditures for Indian IPOs 
using residual income model when growth rate is 0% 
 
   
M/V V/B LnPC LnOS LnTA 
   
Y t α β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 
Adj. 
R2 
F-
Value 
N 
           
ΔTotal  1 0.559*** -0.004*** 0.001*** 1.33*** 13.299*** -0.073*** 0.508 34.58 967 
Assets  (4.69) (-3.46) (3.38) (20.39) (7.52) (-6.48)    
 
2 0.793*** -0.006*** 0.001*** 1.528*** 6.706*** -0.085*** 0.504 34.05 967 
  (5.45) (-4.11) (4.17) (19.25) (7.59) (-6.18)    
 
3 1.105*** -0.008*** 0.001*** 1.575*** 6.815*** -0.098*** 0.471 29.85 967 
  (6.39) (-4.24) (4.65) (16.68) (6.49) (-6.04)    
 
4 1.289*** -0.009*** 0.001*** 1.601*** 7.505*** -0.105*** 0.437 25.19 937 
  (6.41) (-4.23) (4.26) (14.72) (6.21) (-5.6)    
           
ΔInventory 1 0.416* -0.003 0.004*** 0.415*** 8.12 -0.051** 0.12 3.99 849 
  (1.7) (-0.52) (6.50) (2.71) (1.14) (-2.24)    
 
2 1.074*** -0.007 0.005*** 0.414** 6.233 -0.082*** 0.126 4.21 847 
  (3.57) (-1.15) (6.54) (2.24) (0.72) (-2.96)    
 
3 1.25*** -0.014** 0.005*** 0.724*** 13.1 -0.095*** 0.152 5.2 842 
  (3.72) (-2.16) (6.51) (3.49) (1.34) (-3.11)    
 
4 1.137*** -0.017** 0.005*** 0.721*** 5.13 -0.121*** 0.147 4.84 817 
  (2.96) (-2.31) (5.49) (3.03) (0.46) (-3.44)    
           
ΔCash 1 -0.005 -0.009 0.000 3.844*** 72.997*** -0.067 0.334 16.69 961 
  (-0.01) (-1.57) (0.62) (13.32) (9.18) (-1.34)    
 
2 0.173 -0.011* 0.001 3.448*** 62.867*** -0.066 0.284 13.21 961 
  (0.31) (-1.89) (1.39) (11.40) (7.53) (-1.26)    
 
3 0.115 -0.015** 0.001 3.197*** 54.209*** -0.036 0.25 11.08 960 
  (0.2) (-2.46) (1.25) (10.29) (6.34) (-0.67)    
 
4 0.164 -0.015** 0.001 3.061*** 62.171*** -0.093* 0.246 10.51 929 
  (0.28) (-2.54) (1.91) (9.70) (7.20) (-1.71)    
           
ΣCAPEX 1 0.356*** -0.001* 0.0004*** 0.232*** -0.005 -0.045*** 0.196 8.14 967 
  (4.49) (-1.73) (4.19) (5.35) (0.00) (-5.95)    
 
2 0.445*** -0.003** 0.001*** 0.493*** 4.299*** -0.055*** 0.271 12.43 967 
  (4.42) (-2.35) (4.04) (8.94) (2.88) (-5.81)    
 
3 0.621*** -0.004*** 0.001*** 0.652*** 7.918*** -0.073*** 0.302 14.48 967 
  (5.09) (-2.8) (5.07) (9.76) (4.37) (-6.29)    
 
4 0.709*** -0.005*** 0.001*** 0.764*** 9.325*** -0.077*** 0.289 13.64 967 
  (4.79) (-2.92) (4.62) (9.43) (4.25) (-5.54)    
           
ΣR&D 1 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.031 0.000 0.037 1.28 967 
  (0.38) (-0.09) (-0.30) (-0.58) (-0.98) (-0.09)    
 
2 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.008*** -0.698*** 0.000 0.166 6.66 967 
  (0.47) (-0.35) (-0.66) (-3.39) (-10.43) (-0.62)    
 
3 0.005 0.000 0.000 -0.017*** -1.456*** -0.001 0.258 11.62 967 
  (0.67) (-0.45) (-0.80) (-4.53) (-14.24) (-0.82)    
 
4 0.007 0.000 0.000 -0.027*** -2.43*** -0.001 0.33 16.54 967 
  
(0.68) (-0.55) (-0.60) (-4.99) (-16.72) (-0.63) 
   
ΣDebt 1 0.01 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.197 0.001 0.015 0.52 967 
Reduction  (0.59) (0.96) (0.56) (1.27) (0.82) (0.76)    
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2 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.028** 0.448 0.003 0.024 0.83 967 
  (-0.14) (0.83) (0.03) (2.47) (1.47) (1.60)    
 
3 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.079*** 1.293*** 0.005* 0.044 1.56 967 
  (0.12) (-0.14) (-0.45) (4.34) (2.63) (1.63)    
 
4 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.218*** 3.967*** -0.001 0.109 4.09 967 
  (0.75) (-0.57) (1.10) (7.16) (4.80) (-0.10)    
Industry and 
Time FE 
Yes 
 
Notes: This table reports the regression results for IPOs showing the impact of two components of M/B ratio – 
M/V and V/B on the post-issue changes in assets and expenditures. In the above table, the fundamental value of 
the stock i.e. V is computed using Ohlson’s (1990) Residual Income Model with a constant discount rate of 13% 
and terminal growth rate i.e., g=0%. Under growth=0%, fair value is computed with the assumption of no 
earning growth after year 3. We regress changes in six accounting variables i.e. cash, inventory, total assets, 
capital expenditure, R&D and reduction in long-term debt measured over four years post-issue, +1, +2, +3, and 
+4 year. Precisely, the equation is stated as follows: 
 
Where Yit = ((Sit – Si0)/Ai0) for Sit = inventory, cash and total assets, for i
th
 firm and for t=1 to 4 years. Yit = 
( /Ai0) for Si = Capital expenditures, R&D and long-term debt reduction, for i
th
 firm and for j =1 to 4 
years. (M/V)i and (V/B)i are price-to-value and value-to-book components of IPO firm i that are computed based 
on pricing multiples of industry peer. PCi = Primary Capital raised (Offer Price * No. of shares issued) for i
th
 
firm, OSCi = Other sources of capital (Total Funds – PCi) for i
th 
firm. Total sources of funds are sum of funds 
from operations, financing and investment activities. Ai0 = Total Assets at time zero for i
th
 firm. T and I are year 
and industry dummies respectively. Ln[(PCi/Ai0)+1], Ln[(OSCi/Ai0)+1] and Ln[Ai0] are controls variables in the 
regression. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis below the co-efficient value and have been estimated using 
clustered standard errors. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Table 9B 
Effect of mispricing and growth opportunities on post-issue changes in assets and expenditures for Indian IPOs 
using residual income model when growth rate is 5% 
 
      M/V V/B LnPC LnOS LnTA       
Y t α β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 
Adj. 
R2 
F-
Value n 
            
ΔTotal  1 0.644*** -0.013*** 0.0003*** 1.286*** 11.606*** -0.08*** 0.523 33.9 967 
Assets   (5.18) (-4.300 (3.30) (19.72) (6.66) (-7.07)    
 
2 0.941*** -0.019*** 0.001*** 1.498*** 6.079*** -0.097*** 0.53 34.9 967 
  (6.27) (-5.42) (4.13) (19.13) (7.11) (-7.09)    
 
3 1.329*** -0.024*** 0.001*** 1.541*** 6.174*** -0.115*** 0.492 30.01 967 
  (7.35) (-5.77) (4.53) (16.35) (6.00) (-6.97)    
 
4 1.501*** -0.027*** 0.001*** 1.574*** 6.838*** -0.121*** 0.454 24.93 937 
  (7.08) (-5.55) (4.16) (14.45) (5.76) (-6.34)    
           
ΔInventory  1 0.482* -0.001 0.002*** 0.422*** 10.598 -0.059** 0.121 3.74 849 
   (1.85) (-0.15) (6.50) (2.65) (1.43) (-2.51)    
 
2 1.346*** -0.016** 0.003*** 0.492*** 9.625 -0.103*** 0.14 4.41 847 
  (4.25) (-2.38) (6.44) (2.58) (1.07) (-3.62)    
 
3 1.333*** -0.025 0.003*** 0.754*** 17.447 -0.109*** 0.156 4.98 842 
  (3.72) (-1.64) (6.34) (3.49) (1.71) (-3.40)    
 
4 1.163*** -0.034* 0.003*** 0.809*** 11.634 -0.127*** 0.148 4.52 817 
  (2.84) (-1.77) (5.27) (3.24) (1.00) (-3.45)    
           
ΔCash 1 0.091 -0.011 0.000 3.533*** 65.392*** -0.081 0.315 14.16 961 
  (0.16) (-0.87) (0.64) (11.95) (8.14) (-1.59)    
 
2 0.317 -0.007 0.001 3.183*** 56.699*** -0.084 0.271 11.42 961 
  (0.54) (-0.52) (1.40) (10.36) (6.78) (-1.58)    
 
3 0.273 -0.021 0.001 2.953*** 48.107*** -0.046 0.233 9.34 960 
  (0.45) (-1.49) (1.24) (9.35) (5.60) (-0.83)    
 
4 0.121 -0.022 0.001 2.862*** 56.951**** -0.095 0.227 8.72 929 
  (0.20) (-1.53) (1.85) (8.86) (6.53) (-1.70)    
           
ΣCAPEX 1 0.380*** -0.005** 0.0002*** 0.236*** 0.095 -0.049*** 0.211 8.26 967 
  (4.50) (-2.49) (4.09) (5.33) (0.08) (-6.32)    
 
2 0.516*** -0.008*** 0.0003*** 0.497*** 4.274*** -0.062*** 0.283 12.18 967 
  (4.77) (-3.00) (3.91) (8.76) (2.82) (-6.31)    
 
3 0.718*** -0.01*** 0.001*** 0.670*** 8.021*** -0.081*** 0.315 14.23 967 
  (5.47) (-3.21) (4.92) (9.73) (4.36) (-6.79)    
 
4 0.831*** -0.013*** 0.001*** 0.799*** 9.567*** -0.086*** 0.301 13.29 967 
  (5.20) (-3.47) (4.43) (9.53) (4.27) (-5.90)    
           
ΣR&D 1 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.033 0.000 0.039 1.27 967 
  (0.60) (0.14) (-0.29) (-0.72) (-0.98) (-0.23)    
 
2 0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.009*** -0.713*** 0.000 0.168 6.26 967 
  (0.64) (-0.08) (-0.62) (-3.41) (-10.09) (-0.77)    
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3 0.007 0.000 0.000 -0.018*** -1.488*** -0.001 0.262 11.01 967 
  (0.86) (-0.18) (-0.75) (-4.57) (-13.82) (-1.01)    
 
4 0.010 0.000 0.000 -0.029*** -2.487*** -0.001 0.338 15.81 967 
  (0.94) (-0.36) (-0.56) (-5.07) (-16.3) (-0.86)    
           
ΣDebt   1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.154 0.002 0.014 0.45 967 
Reduction    (0.01) (0.09) (0.69) (1.31) (0.66) (1.11)    
 
2 -0.013 0.000 0.000 0.029** 0.421 0.004* 0.024 0.76 967 
  (-0.60) (-0.13) (0.05) (2.57) (1.39) (1.82)    
 
3 -0.012 0.001 0.000 0.082*** 1.387*** 0.006* 0.047 1.53 967 
  (-0.34) (1.01) (-0.42) (4.35) (2.74) (1.74)    
 
4 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.228*** 4.148*** -0.001 0.114 3.97 967 
  (0.55) (0.13) (1.06) (7.08) (4.82) (-0.26)    
Industry and Time 
FE 
Yes 
Notes: This table reports the regression results for IPOs showing the impact of two components of M/B ratio – 
M/V and V/B on the post-issue changes in assets and expenditures. In the above table, the fundamental value of 
the stock i.e. V is computed using Ohlson’s (1990) Residual Income Model with a constant discount rate of 13% 
and terminal growth rate i.e., g=5%. Under growth=5%, fair value is computed with the assumption of 5% 
indefinite earnings growth after year 3. We regress changes in six accounting variables i.e. cash, inventory, total 
assets, capital expenditure, R&D and reduction in long-term debt measured over four years post-issue, +1, +2, 
+3, and +4 year. Precisely, the equation is stated as follows: 
 
Where Yit = ((Sit – Si0)/Ai0) for Sit = inventory, cash and total assets, for i
th
 firm and for t=1 to 4 years. Yit = 
( /Ai0) for Si = Capital expenditures, R&D and long-term debt reduction, for i
th
 firm and for j =1 to 4 
years. (M/V)i and (V/B)i are price-to-value and value-to-book components of IPO firm i that are computed based 
on pricing multiples of industry peer. PCi = Primary Capital raised (Offer Price * No. of shares issued) for i
th
 
firm, OSCi = Other sources of capital (Total Funds – PCi) for i
th 
firm. Total sources of funds are sum of funds 
from operations, financing and investment activities. Ai0 = Total Assets at time zero for i
th
 firm. T and I are year 
and industry dummies respectively. Ln[(PCi/Ai0)+1], Ln[(OSCi/Ai0)+1] and Ln[Ai0] are controls variables in the 
regression. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis below the co-efficient value and have been estimated using 
clustered standard errors. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Appendix A1 
Listing time firm characteristics for IPO firms and their respective one-to-one matches 
 
Variable N 
Mean of 
IPO firm 
Mean of 
Match Firm 
Difference t-value p-value 
       
Sales (INR Millions) 1,856 1437.7 1124.8 312.9 1.51 0.132 
Total Assets (INR Millions) 1,856 2784.4 2169.7 614.7 0.93 0.355 
Market Cap (INR Millions) 1,856 3848.1 2898.7 949.4 1.63 0.113 
EBIT (INR Millions) 1,856 326.7 209.6 117.1 1.60 0.110 
EBIT to TA 1,856 0.104 0.101 0.003 0.65 0.513 
Profit Margin 1,856 2.810 4.103 -1.293 -0.84 0.399 
 
This table reports summary statistics for the set of proxy variables (firm characteristics) of newly listed 1,856 
IPO firms and their respective identical one-to-one matched firms from 1991 to 2012. All data are sourced in 
PRIME database. Here ‘Match Firms’ refer to one-to-one matched firms using price multiple methodology 
outlined in Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005). N refers to the number of observations available for the respective 
variable in each category. Mean is the arithmetic average value for each proxy variable. All the non-ratio proxy 
variables have been reported in Million Indian Rupees. We use the two-sample mean-comparison test (T-
statistics) to test the significance of differences in mean values. ‘Difference’ refers to the difference in mean of 
IPO firms and their respective matched firms. ‘t-value’ (p-value) refers to the respective T-statistics (P-Value) 
of the difference in mean. 
 
